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Abstract
There is a need to address current military strategies to defeat the resilience of the Boko
Haram Terrorist (BHT) group. The purpose of this qualitative study was to provide a
counter-ideology framework as an alternative strategy to defeat the group. The
relational/vengeance and relative deprivation theories provided the theoretical foundation
for the study, and the research question addressed the extent to which counter-ideology
strategies can be instituted to defeat the BHT group. Data were collected through semi
structured interviews from 20 participants who were Muslim clerics, community leaders,
and military personnel, and data were analyzed using Nvivo software. The themes for the
study were developed using a content analysis approach. The findings indicated that the
resilience of Boko Haram was due to the group’s ability to maintain an ideological
consistency with the extreme version of Jihadi-Salaﬁsm. Thus, there is a need to develop
an effective reconciliatory national security strategy that is focused on counter-ideology
policies to augment the ongoing military strategy. Given that counter-ideology offers a
nonmilitary counterterrorism approach, it can deescalate the security situation in
Northeast Nigeria, which can lead to socioeconomic benefits for the youth in Nigeria.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
The current military crackdown on the Boko Haram Terrorist (BHT) group in
Nigeria has significantly affected the group’s ability to undertake coordinated major
offensive operations. However, relying on this military force and negotiations has not
neutralized the group’s ideology. Additionally, the continuous use of excessive military
force against Boko Haram has resulted in significant increase in the death of innocent
civilians caught up in the fighting. Considering the complexity of the threat from the
BHT group, it is important to augment the current security measures with strategies that
focus on targeting the ideology of the group (Muhammad & Mostarom, 2011). It is
against this background that this study was initiated to ascertain the usefulness of
counter-ideology as a strategy for defeating the BHT group.
Background
Ideology is a set of ideas, opinions, or narratives that provide individuals with an
identity, a purpose, and a sense of importance. In religious contexts, ideology provides
individuals with a social bond and a sense of redemption and atonement for sins and past
shame. For terrorists, ideology provides them with a justification for their acts of
violence. In other words, terrorist groups rationalize their actions within a framework of
an ideological orientation to attract potential recruits (Sedgwick, 2007; Cohen et al.,
2018). In the case of the BHT group, its ideological discourses and the way it sustains
itself requires an understanding of how the group emerged. The emergence of the BHT
group in Northern Nigeria since July 2009 has caused the death of many people through
suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks. The BHT group phenomenon has also been
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attributed to extremist impulses embedded in the sociopolitical realities of Northern
Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2013).
Such sociopolitical realities are linked to poverty, economic disparities between
the wealthy and the poor and religious violence in Northern Nigeria (Adesoji, 2010;
Bakare, 2016; Walker, 2012). As is to be expected, Boko Haram is taking advantage of
this situation to reinforce the ideological orientation of its members (Olojo, 2013;
Abdullah, 2017). This is evident as young people continue to follow the propaganda and
ideological narratives of Boko Haram (Flaherty, 2013; Onuoha, 2014). Apart from being
a brainwashing device, terrorist ideology also functions as a tool for exploiting religious
beliefs to incite hatred, violence, and schism in most societies in Northern Nigeria. It is
therefore not surprising that the BHT group uses ideology as a narrative to justify
violence against their perceived existential enemies.
Efforts by the government of Nigeria to halt the increasing violence of Boko
Haram have so far relied on two major approaches (Human Rights Watch, 2012). These
approaches are the carrot and stick strategies that seek to negotiate with Boko Haram and
at the same time imposing a military crackdown on the group (Abonyi & Ezeh, 2017).
However, these strategies, particularly the military crackdown on the group, have not
limited the activities of the BHT group. Though security and military responses remain
important, they have not addressed the Boko Haram threat in Nigeria like the case of Iraq
and Afghanistan (Bush, 2009; Onapajo, 2017). Wilkinson (2011) contended that the use
of military power was counterproductive in the war on terrorism following the 9/11
terrorist attacks in the United States. The extent to which counterterrorism strategies can
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be successful against the BHT group in Nigeria therefore depends on a deeper
understanding of the ideology of the group.
Researchers have argued that it is necessary to counter the group’s ideological
narratives by replacing them with compelling alternative messages, in comparison to the
military approach that is currently in use in Nigeria (Ladbury et al., 2016; Fenstermacher
et al., 2011). Nigeria’s current military strategy in response to the BHT group has been
suppressive and requires a change to ensure an effective counterterrorism effort (Aghedo
& Osumah, 2012; Chinwokwu, 2013; Ra’ad al-Hussein et al., 2014). This is against the
backdrop that the prominent ideological factor that drives the BHT group is influenced by
the ideals of the political authority of Islam which relies on the instructions of the oldfashioned Islamic intellectual, Ibn Taymiyya (Barkindo, 2013). Relying on counterideological approach as a strategy for defeating terrorists’ ideology is therefore feasible
(Lerner, 2016). In the opinion of former President Obama, military force alone was not
enough to defeat any terrorist group because ideologies cannot be defeated with weapons
(Bello, 2017). Moreover, counter-ideology can change the minds of Muslims from
believing that terrorism is authorized by Islam, assure non-Muslims that the religion of
Islam is not the cause or source of terrorism, and can also rehabilitate terrorists
(Abdullah, 2017). Thus, I conducted this study to address how counter-ideology can be
used to augment the current military approach to defeat the BHT group.
Problem Statement
The activities of the BHT group in Northeastern Nigeria pose security challenges
to the country. Though the use of military force against terrorists is a viable option, its
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usefulness against terrorist ideologies has not yielded the intended results. After decades
of the armed forces of Nigeria waging military operations against the BHT group, this
has only reduced minimally the group’s ability to conduct offensive operations (Agbiboa,
2013; Regens et al., 2016).
The group’s resilience is linked to its ideology which is based on the radical
Salafist philosophy. Given that the terrorist ideology is a critical factor in the
radicalization of both individuals and groups, it is important that any strategy to defeat
the BHT group first dismantle the group’s ideology. A multipronged and multifaceted
approach is as a consequence, a necessary strategy for eliminating terrorist ideologies
(Hassan, 2006). For this reason, counterterrorism efforts that do not include a counterideology strategy cannot defeat the group’s resilience. However, efforts by the Nigerian
government to defeat Boko Haram have been focused on military counterinsurgency
operations and intelligence-driven counterterrorism strategies.
Although several studies have addressed various counterterrorism strategies
against the BHT group, there is a lack of literature on counter-ideology as one of the
viable approaches for defeating the group. Other counterterrorism experts believe that
terrorist ideology is a significant factor that incites individuals to engage in terrorist
activities. As a result, if the ideology is not defeated, counterterrorism efforts by
governments will not be successful (Biddle 2002; Iyekekpolo, 2016). The need for the
government of Nigeria to adopt a new approach that explores counter-ideology as part of
a broad counterterrorism strategy is therefore a necessity.
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Purpose
The increasing ideological motivation of the BHT group is a contributing factor
for the resilience of the group and the precarious security situation facing Nigeria. Based
on its orientation, the BHT group advocates a jihadist approach to religious domination
and governance in Nigeria. The advocacy is based on the group’s ideological narrative
and an ideational framework that all the sociopolitical ills, economic, and moral problems
affecting Muslims in contemporary Nigeria can be eliminated by the application of rigid
Islamic norms (Bello, 2017; Oriola & Akinola, 2018). The purpose of this qualitative
study was therefore to explore the suitability of a counter-ideology strategy as a
complimentary counterterrorism strategy to facilitate the defeat of the BHT group.
Research Question
To what extent can counter-ideology strategies be instituted to defeat the Boko
Haram Terrorist group?
Theoretical Framework
Various theoretical constructs have alluded to the Nigerian government’s
ineffective approach to combating the BHT group. Once a state is unable to provide
required security and safety to its citizens, then citizens can become disloyal to the state
(Uzodik & Maiangwa, 2012). In Northeastern Nigeria for instance, the locals have been
compelled to pledge their loyalty to their community and religious leaders, and exposed
them to terrorism as they strive to secure a common communal identity. Thus, the BHT
group continues to exploit marginalized areas by using ideology to mobilize support from
their sympathizers.
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In this study, relational/vengeance theory and deprivation theory were used to
explain the extent of security challenges confronting Nigeria’s effort in combating the
BHT group. The relational/vengeance theory clarifies the reasons for inter-group
conflicts and helps explore the sociopolitical, economic, and historical relationships that
exist among groups (Alozieuwa, 2012). The theory is based on the premise that value and
cultural differences as well as the interest of groups affect the interactions among
individuals and groups differently (Dixon et al., 2003).
The relational/vengeance theoretical framework applies to the activities of the
BHT group in the context of the history of disagreement among tribal groups in Nigeria
due to the negative stereotypes, religious intolerance, and discrimination (Faleti, 2006).
For instance, the BHT group has been described by the local population and the
government based on several negative perceptions (Okereke, 2011). The group is
perceived as terrorists with psychiatric challenges. These perceptions have fed into the
“we” and “others” dichotomy, creating mutual antagonism that has been violently
expressed. As a result, the channels of communication between the government and the
group are disrupted anytime attempts have been made to resolve the underlying issues,
especially because the BHT group’s violent efforts have not been understood.
Moreover, the relational/vengeance theory elucidates that as efforts to combat the
BHT group intensifies, the government becomes the “we” and the group becomes the
“others.” This opposes the way the BHT group sees itself as they consider themselves
bound by a common purpose of defeating the “unbelievers.” Boko Haram members also
consider themselves as deprived and regard the remaining members of the Nigerian
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society as the “others.” In their view, the use of brutal military force by the armed forces
of Nigeria against them must inevitably attract reprisals from their members. The
relational/vengeance theory is thus a theory that can illuminate the BHT group’s resolve
to avenge its members at all cost even in the face of the overwhelming military might of
the Nigerian security forces against the group. Therefore, an effective method of
preventing prejudice in the fight against the BHT group is to target their extreme
ideology and stereotypes through counter-ideological interventions (Hayes et al., 1999).
Through this process, people can critically assess their prejudicial thoughts without
reacting negatively to the group (Hayes et al., 1999).
Similarly, the relative deprivation theory suggests that people feel dissatisfied and
frustrated when they compare their socioeconomic status with others. The discrepancies
between the aspirations of individuals and their daily lives tend to frustrate people and
push them to join violent political movements. The theory therefore illuminates the
behavioral effects of deprivation and the exploration of an individual’s feelings of
deprivation resulting from comparing their situation with a referent person or group.
The relative deprivation theory applies to the Boko Haram situation in Nigeria
because the discrepancies in socioeconomic prosperity of the people living in the
northern part of Nigeria provide one of the reasons for the deviant behavior of some
individuals. Such deprivation and frustration may lead to people acting aggressively,
which often manifests as terrorist acts (Dollard et al., 1939). Therefore, the relative
deprivation theory provides a theoretical explanation for the feeling of inequality among
Boko Haram members that drives them into acts of terrorism.
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Nature of the Study
The research involved qualitative research methods to explore how counterideology strategies can contribute to the defeat of the BHT group. To facilitate this, I
employed a phenomenological approach to enable me to understand the firsthand
experiences of individuals who have been exposed to the atrocities of the BHT group. I
conducted semi structured interviews with 20 participants to gather their responses to
questions that addressed the research question.
Definitions
Counter ideology: The disruption of jihadist propaganda through the removal of
their propaganda materials and messages including theological messages from the
Internet and deporting the identified jihadist or jihadists (Sedgwick, 2012).
Counterterrorism: Includes proactive practices, military tactics, techniques, and
strategy that government organizations such as law enforcement, the military, businesses,
and the intelligence agencies use to identify terrorist groups and individuals to neutralize
or prevent terrorist from conducting further attacks (Mahan & Griset, 2012).
Dawah: The fulfilment of the command to call people’s attention and rationality
toward the path of Allah based on an ideology that is generally believed to reward
believers and provide further advantages to adherents (AlFaruqi, 1976).
Deradicalization: Is a process that involves reforming people who have been
exposed to violent and extreme religious views or violent political ideologies into more
moderate citizens (Altier et al., 2016).
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Extremism: Any form of Islamic deviance that deviates from a pattern of behavior
and opposes the democratic principles such as individual liberties, the rule of law, and the
tolerance and mutual respect for people who practice different faiths and beliefs within a
given social context (Webber et al., 2018).
Hadith: The recorded speeches, activities, tacit endorsements, and characteristics
of Prophet Muhammad that are ranked next to the Qur’an and regarded as a source for
Islamic religious laws and moral guidance (Junaidi et al., 2017).
Hijra: The relocation of Prophet Muhammad from Mecca accompanied by his
followers to avoid the persecutions of the newly converted followers and also allow them
to learn the laws of Islam from the Prophet himself (Uberman & Shay, 2016).
Ideology: Is a unified, dynamically changing set of ideas or beliefs held
collectively by a group that is often expressed verbally or in semiotic, performative,
ritualistic, or in a behavioral form (Griffin, 2006).
Izala: An Islamic reformist movement originally formed in Northern Nigeria but
is now present in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Their mission is to counter any form of
innovations introduced into Islam by the Sufi brotherhood (Hayatu et al., 2017).
Jihad: An individual moral struggle associated with a spiritual obligation to a
noble cause which is observed with determination but does not mean a holy war (AboulEnein, 2009).
Radicalism: The process by which individuals are motivated to advocate a
complete political or social reform through violence against perceived adversaries or
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symbolic targets as a means of achieving political goals and behavioral change
(Doosje et al., 2016).
Salaﬁsm: A puritanical form of Islam that advocates a rigid adherence to all
Quranic injunctions and the prophetic traditions associated with the original ideals of
Sunni orthodoxy and totally forbids religious innovations in any form (Lauziere, 2015;
Kassim, 2015).
Sharia: A set of laws that guide all aspects of Muslim life and provide a clear path
to fulfillment in life including daily routines and success in the hereafter (Johnson &
Vriens, 2011).
Takfı̄r: A theological doctrine in Islam that justifies the classification of Muslims
who are considered to have abandoned the Islam faith as inﬁdels (Kassim, 2015).
Wahhabism: A form of Islam that is based on an Islamic doctrine and is aimed at
restoring unadulterated monotheistic worship by devotees and named after Muhammad
ibn `Abdul-Wahhab (1703-1792), who is regarded as its founder (Qamar, 2015).
Assumptions
The participants in this research were stratified into three categories; Muslim
clergy, community opinion leaders, and the military. I assumed that the initial
respondents in this study would refer me to other potential participants in line with the
snowballing strategy I chose. Given that the Muslim clergy are considered the ultimate
interpreters of Islamic jurisprudence, I also assumed that they will drive the counterideology efforts by reaching out to most Muslims through the use of suitable counter
radical narratives emanating from Islamic teachings.
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Scope and Delimitations
The intent of this research was to focus on counter-ideology as the basis for
defeating the resilience of the BHT group. The study covered the Northeastern part of
Nigeria because Boko Haram operates primarily in the area. The years under review in
this study covered the period from 2009 to 2016, a period associated with intensification
in the activities of the group that earned them worldwide notoriety. Besides the growing
influence of Boko Haram and the need to understand its current state, this study was also
focused on identifying the ideological construct that shapes the group’s resilience.
The BHT group is responsible for the current cross-border terrorism in West
Africa, especially across Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. There are global concerns
regarding the burden of managing the undeveloped economic status of these countries in
addition to the problems associated with terrorism. However, this study did not focus on
the impact of the group’s activities in these countries.
Limitations
The participants were expected to be able to articulate their thoughts freely
regarding the experience being studied. However, some participants, particularly, those
within the community leader category found it difficult to express themselves well
because the mode of communication used during the interview was in English. Their
limited proficiency in the English language affected their ability to provide authentic
accounts of their experiences given that I had to hire research assistants proficient in the
local languages to administer the questionnaire.
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Another limitation in this research related to the use of snowball sampling.
Because of the sensitive nature of the research topic, there were some ethical problems.
Keeping participants anonymous from each other was difficult because initial participants
within the sample frame had to recruit other participants in line with the snowballing
technique. Moreover, apart from the initial participants, I had no control over the
sampling method used in the referral process, which could have had some elements of
bias. To overcome these limitations, a sizeable number of referrals were collected out of
which I randomly selected the eventual participants.
Limitations in this study also stemmed from the inherent weaknesses in how
secondary data sources such as academic articles and books on counterterrorism were
interpreted. Many of these data obtained from archival documents in Nigeria contained
elements of propaganda designed to encourage readers to adapt a certain perspective.
Furthermore, both governmental and parliamentary online sources on counterterrorism
were disorganized. Additionally, there was also a lack of archival documents on counterideology as a strategy for counterterrorism. Due to these difficulties, the analysis of
secondary data obtained from documentary sources could be deficient in the preferred
intellectual rigor. These limitations could also affect the reliability of the findings
concerning the usefulness of relying on counter-ideology to defeat the resilience of the
BHT group.
Significance
The security problems caused by the activities of the BHT group makes it
pertinent that Nigeria formulates appropriate strategies to halt the terrorist attacks from
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the group. Examining the group’s ideology as a basis for formulating counter-ideology
strategies thus has both scholarly and practical significance. At the scholarly level, this
study filled the gaps in the literature by incorporating counter-ideology measures into
counterterrorism strategies. It also serves as a building block for future research into
counter-ideology as an approach for defeating terrorist groups. The practical importance
of this study lies in its potential of becoming the basis for developing a policy framework
for countries in need of appropriate counter-ideology policies to defeat terrorism. The
study also provides various counterterrorism stakeholders with insights into the
importance of understanding the complex nature of terrorism ideology and the
complementary role counter-ideology strategies, as part of broader counterterrorism
measures, could play.
Another significance of this study is its prospects of driving a positive social
change in Nigeria. Nigeria as a secular state treats citizens equally regardless of religion.
However, the nature of terrorist acts being committed by the BHT group has elements of
religious ideological undertones. Boko Haram’s activities have therefore become a threat
to the social equilibrium and proper social functioning of the people of Nigeria (Oyewole,
2013). Addressing the influence that ideology plays in sustaining the resilience of the
BHT group is therefore necessary to ensure a nonviolent society that will keep Nigeria
safe.
Summary
This chapter introduced the study and the background. The chapter also
highlighted the purpose, scope, significance, problem statement, limitations and
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delimitations, research questions, and the related theoretical framework. In Chapter 2, I
provide reviews of contemporary discourses and a survey of contending arguments
regarding the efficacy of counter-ideology as a useful counterterrorist strategy to defeat
the BHT group. In Chapter 3, I present the design and rationale of the research and my
role as the researcher, design data collection procedures, population and sample frame,
sample size, and an assessment of issues of quality and ethical considerations. In Chapter
4, I describe the research setting, demographics of participants, the data collection and the
analysis process, evidence of trustworthiness, and the results. Finally, I interpret the
findings and make recommendations for future research in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Developing effective counterterrorism strategies against the BHT group is
contingent on an understanding of the ideology sustaining the resilience of the group.
Having struggled to defeat the group militarily, the discourse on a counterterrorism
strategy against the BHT group has now shifted to a new approach that is aimed at
targeting the group’s ideology. I reviewed contemporary literature on counter-ideology as
a strategy for defeating the resilience of the BHT, which I present in this chapter. The
literature review further provided a survey of contending arguments regarding the
efficacy of counter-ideology as a useful strategy in prescribing counterterrorism measures
to defeat the BHT group. From a scholarly perspective, I also evaluated the varied
perspectives of relevant methodological context and theoretical techniques applicable to
the field of counter-ideology.
Literature Search Strategy
A systematic process of searching through databases by using key concepts based
on a topic or research question to retrieve results is a search strategy. I carried out the
literature search for this study by conducting preliminary searches in the Walden
University digital library to identify databases that were relevant to the topic. Political
Science Complete, EBSCO, SAGE Full Collections, ProQuest, PsycINFO, and the digital
library belonging to Homeland Security were utilized further. Google and Google Scholar
were also relied on to access additional literature from keywords related to the research
topic.
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Because each of the databases functioned differently, separate search strategies
were adopted for each database to increase the chances of finding more information. For
each database, I limited the searches to themes, keywords, and important phrases as
initial searches. There were instances during the process where the initial search of the
literature did not provide relevant articles and peer-reviewed journals. In such cases, the
search was reviewed by using a series of keywords in a variety of combinations to source
for relevant articles in selected databases. I also obtained additional information by
checking the reference lists of similar research conducted to ascertain the appropriateness
of those references to the review.
Theoretical Framework
The Relational/Vengeance
The relational/vengeance theory is one of the theories that provide relevant
context for appreciating the nature of terrorism emanating from the BHT group. The
theory clarifies the causes of violent conflicts between groups as well as the sociopolitical
and economic relationships among such groups (Alozieuwa, 2012). It is based on the
premise of differences in cultural, value, and group interests that influence relationships
among individuals and groups in different ways (Dixon et al., 2003). The
relational/vengeance theory is relevant to the activities of the BHT group because of the
numerous conflicts resulting from disagreements among religious groups in Nigeria due
to negative stereotypes, religious intolerance, and discrimination (Faleti, 2010).
The BHT group has been described by the local population and the government
based on several negative perceptions (Okereke, 2011). The group is perceived as
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terrorists and psychologically challenged because citizens including the government of
Nigeria, who are Boko Haram’s targets, do not understand the reason for the group’s
violence against innocent people. These perceptions have created a scenario of “we”
versus “others,” resulting in mutual antagonism which is often expressed violently. As a
result, negotiations between the government and the group have not resolved the BHT
group’s violence. According to the relational/vengeance theory, as efforts to defeat the
group intensify, the government becomes the “we” and Boko Haram members are
categorized as the “others.” Similarly, the BHT group sees itself as the “we” bound by
their common goal of defeating the “unbelievers” for Allah and regard the rest of the
Nigerian society as the “others.” It is in this context that the use of military force by the
armed forces of Nigeria, regarded as the “others,” against the group leads to retaliation.
Thus, the relational/vengeance theory explains the group’s resolve to avenge its members
despite the military operations conducted against them by the Nigerian Security Forces.
Based on the fact that the genesis of the BHT group is also traceable to religious
extremism, an effective approach for preventing prejudice in the fight against the BHT
group may be to reduce stereotyping through mindful interventions. This study therefore
adopted the relational/vengeance due to its usefulness in illuminating the fundamental
issues that have accounted for the survival and resilience of the BHT group since their
emergence in 2009 to present-day.
Relative Deprivation Theory
The relative deprivation theory was founded by J. C. Davies in his study
“Towards a Theory of Revolution.” The theory suggests that people feel discontent when
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they compare the socioeconomic gap between them and others because they lack what
they feel are their legitimate entitlements (Davies, 1962). The theory reinforces the
frustrations associated with the feelings of deprivation and discontent as a point of
reference. It also encourages the examination of individuals’ feelings of deprivation
resulting from a comparison of their situation to other persons. Gurr (1970) further
explained that people become dissatisfied when they feel that they have less than they
should have. Over a time, this dissatisfaction due to structural poverty and inequality
leads to frustration and then rebellion against the (real or perceived) source of their
deprivation. In effect, the disparities between legitimate aspirations and reality tend to
frustrate people and eventually lead to violent political movements and terrorism (Gurr,
1970; Mavalla & Mbagwu, 2016).
In line with the relative deprivation theory, individuals or terrorist groups can also
engage in deviant behavior when their means do not correspond to their goals. In the case
of the BHT group, instead of deprivation, the discrepancies between their expectations
and the needs that they have achieved is the reason for their frustration and the resultant
violence (Forest, 2012). The essence of the theory is thus consistent with the fact that
violent actions escalates in environments of continuous grievances caused by relative
deprivation. Furthermore, the theory explains why people who are denied justice and
privilege that they deem valuable in their societies, tend to align themselves to radical
social groups as the only option for drawing attention to their complaints.
Relating this theory to Boko Haram, the group perceives themselves to have been
economically and religiously deprived by the actions and inactions of the Nigerian
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government. For instance, at the formative stage of the BHT group, members needed
Mohammed Yusuf as a leader and a mentor to guide them in their Islamic renaissance
drive. The arrest and subsequent extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf and other
members of the group by the Nigerian Security Forces was therefore considered as a
deprivation of the fundamental right to life of their comrades (Ordu, 2017).
Moreover, in their view, the refusal of the federal government to replace western
education with an Islamic educational model in Northern Nigeria constituted a
deprivation of their right of choice to select a model of education that is consistent with
their Islamic faith. Furthermore, Boko Haram views the Nigerian government’s
opposition to the creation of the Islamic state for Northern Nigeria as a deprivation of
their rights to self-governance (Raineri & Martini, 2017). The rule by the federal
government is thus regarded by the group as part of an unbeliever government over
Muslims. Additionally, the presence of the Christian minority in the northern part of
Nigeria and the unwillingness of these Christians to relocate from what they believe to be
the holy territory of Allah, has been interpreted by Boko Haram as a deprivation of their
rights to their territory.
Review of Literature
Synopsis of Religious Dynamics in Northern Nigeria
The Hausa, Fulani, and the Kanuri tribes, who are mostly Islamic adherents,
dominate the northern part of Nigeria. Nigeria is also considered the most religious
divergent country in the world, with religious orientations being important in defining
Nigerians than any other identity (Delia, Barkindo, & Jacobson, 2015). Though other
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religions like ancestral worship exist, Northern Nigeria is mostly polarized between
Christians and Muslims with a history of religious intolerance. In addition to religious
intolerance, Christians and Muslims in Northern Nigeria have lived in an environment
characterized by violent confrontations due to negative stereotypes (Chiluwa &
Odebunmi, 2016). These stereotypes have also become a focal point of polarized
religiopolitical ideations, which has made people less accommodating and more prone to
violent conflicts (Dowd, 2016; Esteban & Mayoral, 2011; Sampson, 2015).
The relationship between Muslims in the north and Christian immigrants has been
characterized by conflicts due to ethnic and religious hostilities, which have impacted the
sociopolitical stability in the northern part of the country (Aliyu, Moorty, & Idris, 2016).
Religion is a central force for mobilizing people with diverse backgrounds toward a
common cause (Huntington, 1996). However, Christians and Muslims have felt
increasingly insecure and vulnerable in parts of Northern Nigeria. The religious bigotry
in Northern Nigeria usually start as normal civic disputes but often degenerate into
communal and religious violence. This development has led to the death of thousands of
innocent citizens and reflects the contentious nature Islam was introduced into Northern
Nigeria.
Islam was introduced into Northern Nigeria by Saudi Arabia Muslim scholars
from two opposite directions (Nachande, 2017). The first version was introduced in the
Bornu Empire, which corresponds to present-day Northeastern Nigeria during the
Seventh and the Eighth Centuries. The second type emerged in Hausaland in what is
presently Northwest Nigeria. Another school of thought argued that Islam was introduced
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by Fulani and Wagara Arabs merchants from Futa-Toro in Senegal in the Fourteenth
Century (Adeleye, 1971). Whether the introduction of Islam from these different sources
conveyed similar doctrine and practice of the religion is not clear and might be a reason
for the current conflicting practices of Islam in Northern Nigeria. For example, Nachande
(2017) suggested that indigenes who accepted Islam retained their native religious
practices, thereby tainting the purity of Islam. Among the Hausa people for instance,
Islamic practices were mixed with idolatry and witchcraft (Al-Bili, 2007; Okene &
Ahmad, 2011). These practices are regarded as a deviation from the tenets of true Islam.
The need to create the awareness to stop the innovations in the practice of Islam
set the stage for the first jihad in Northern Nigeria. This jihad was led by the Fulani
reformist, Usman Dan Fodio from 1757 to 1817 (Pieri & Zenn, 2016). The consciousness
created by Dan Fodio in the 18th Century started the groundwork for the subsequent
acceptance of Salafism in Northern Nigeria as a way of restoring the original Islamic
faith (Kassim, 2015). Salafism, also known as Wahhabism, represents the most extremist
Sunni Muslim followers of the Maliki School of Islamic Law. Consequently, over time,
Salafism evolved in Nigeria into two strands: the Radical Jihadist Salafist and the
Quietist Salafists versions. Both versions, however, forbid theological innovations and
advocate the return to the original practice of Islam in line with the Prophet’s generation
(Ungureanu, 2011). The most divergent distinction between the two strands is the full
endorsement of the use of jihad by the radical Jihadist Salafist as a means of establishing
an Islamic state, a position which is opposed by the Quietist Salafist (Canci & Odukoya,
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2016). These distinct theological traditions have made Northern Nigeria more susceptible
to competing Islamic theological schools of thought (Kassim, 2015).
The contemporary manifestations of Wahhabis-Salafi across Northern Nigeria
have been attributed to the works of Nasir Kabara (Khadiriyya), Ahmad Gulan from the
Ahmadiyya Movement, and Dahiru Bauchi (Tariqqa). Others include Isiaku Rabiu
(Tijjaniyya), Abubakar Gumi (Izala), and Sheik Ibrahim El-Zakzakky from the Muslim
Brotherhood (Oyeniyi, 2014). Some scholars have also posited that the emergence of
Salafist Jihadist like Mohammed Marwa and Muhammad Yusuf, who founded the
radical Maitatsine Sect and the BHT group respectively, explains the reason for the
current revival of Jihadist Salafism in Northern Nigeria (Adesoji, 2011; Loimeier, 2012;
Iyekekpolo, 2016). Therefore, the radical jihadist orientation of the BHT group depends
on the radical Salafism ideology as a tool for the mobilization of terrorist activities.
The Ideology of Boko Haram Terrorist Group
Many researchers have posited that ideology is crucial in understanding global
terrorism (Goodwin & Strang, 2012; Oprescu, 2013; Shay, 2013). What has sustained the
BHT group over the years is the ideological belief of its members in their struggles. The
group’s continuous attacks can therefore be viewed from the perspective of the
ideological influence of the Salafist philosophy. This belief, in part, seeks to restore the
orthodox Islam that was practiced by the Sahabah who was a companion of Prophet
Mohammed and the two generations thereafter (Sampson, 2016). Additionally, its
overarching intent is to overthrow the current secular government through a jihad and
create a puritanical Islamic state that depends on the dictates of sharia in Nigeria. The
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jihadist Islamist ideology is a form of Islamic civilization that connects beliefs, thoughts,
and myths to action (Cannizzaro & Gholami, 2018). Terrorist ideology has also been
linked to Wahhabism and the Salafist Jihadist ideology—a religious ideology associated
with extreme religious principles that call for absolute loyalty and commitment to a
jihadist cause (Moghadam, 2009).
For Boko Haram, their distinct form of the jihadi-Salaﬁsm is characterized by an
ideological propensity for violent rebellion that is rooted in the militant alternative of
political Islam. The literature has also suggested that the group’s ideological afﬁliation to
the jihadi-Salafism is consistent with the historical narratives derived from the jihadi
legacy of Dan Fodio. Moreover, Boko Haram’s ideology resonates with the philosophy of
both the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda, whose version of Wahhabi-inspired
Salaﬁsm is blended with a revolutionary program aimed at toppling un-Islamic
governments in the Muslim world (Lassalle & Akgul, 2016). Boko Haram’s ideological
orientation is also premised on the belief that all the sociopolitical and economic ills and
the resultant challenges of moral decadence confronting Muslims in contemporary
Nigeria can be eliminated by the application of Islamic norms (Forest, 2012; Kassim,
2015). As such, members of the group consider their call a religious imperative to
mobilize activists to wage jihad and overthrow the secular Nigerian government as a
means for creating an Islamic state.
As is the case with most terrorist groups, the BHT group has exploited the
religious doctrines of the Jihadist Salafist to justify the group’s implementation of some
Islamic doctrines for jihad. By infusing the ideology of jihadi-Salaﬁsm and the historical
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antecedents of the revival of Islam in Northern Nigeria, the group has used the legacy of
Dan Fodio’s jihad to justify its version of jihad in Northeastern Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2016;
Kassim, 2015). Boko Haram also elicits sympathy and legitimacy to its jihad cause by
invoking the “us” versus “them” narratives (Agbiboa, 2013; Quiggin, 2009).
The ideology of Boko Haram is considered as a persuasive tool based on an
extreme interpretation of the Islamic principles of jihad (Kassim, 2015), meaning that the
group considers its religious battle as a legitimate one against those who in their view
want to impose on Nigerians, a secular form of governance based on Western norms and
values. They also believe that governing by any form of legislation other than the Sharıa
was an act of profanity and polytheism (Muhammed, 2014). This strain of theological
rhetoric, framed to include a rebellion and a jihadi campaign to target the Nigerian
political elite, is therefore fundamental to the ideology of the BHT group.
Other ideological discourse motivating the jihadi campaign of Boko Haram is
based on the dogmatic application of the doctrine of takfı̄r. As posited by Pieri and Zenn
(2016), Boko Haram consider the concept of takfı̄r as a way of differentiating between
true believers and those who in their view have accepted other social and religious
practices in a manner that is inconsistent with the interpretation of Islam. By describing
them as inﬁdels, Boko Haram considers these people as legitimate targets of jihad. In
other words, the application of the doctrine of takfı̄r obligates Muslims to declare jihad
on political rulers because according to them, these rulers were usurping God’s laws.
Additional literature indicated that Boko Haram is not a monolithic entity with a
unified purpose. The doctrine of takfir as part of Boko Haram’s ideology is a major point
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of disagreement that has caused the emergence of at least three offshoots that are
competing for attention and followers (Karmon, 2014; Comolli, 2015; Kassim, 2015).
Moreover these factions disagree on tactics and strategic directions of the group.
Abubakar Shekau heads the faction that has refused to negotiate and wants to
implement strict Sharia law across Nigeria (Weeraratne, 2017). Another faction, the
Islamic State of West African Province is headed by Abu-Musab al-Barnawi appointed
by ISIS. Mamman Nur who is the son of Mohammed Yusuf and believed to be loyal to
the al-Barnawi’s faction leads the third group known as Ansaru (Onuoha, 2016; Kulungu,
2019). Such developments mean that the BHT group is currently an entity that
continuously reshape and remodel itself with shifting agendas, tactics, and leadership.
Despite the lingering internal crisis within the group, each faction has relied
largely on various aspects of the Salafist ideologies and further exploited them as tools
for indoctrinating and radicalizing their members (Kassim, 2015). This trend makes it
imperative to understand the link between the radical Jihadist ideology and terrorism in
Northern Nigeria.
Link between Radical Jihadist Ideology and Terrorism in Northern Nigeria
Ideology has been portrayed in various intellectual discourses as an important
motivating factor that drives individuals’ and groups’ activities towards political violence
(Pettinger, 2017). On his part, Ender et al. (2014) posited that terrorist ideology includes
religious, political, economic, psychological, and cultural factors that inspire the
deliberate incitement of fear amongst people.
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As already alluded to, Boko Haram’s ideological underpinnings and goals are
inspired by the Salafi Jihadist ideology. Agbiboa (2013a) viewed the Salafi Jihadist
ideology which the BHT group identifies itself with, as an identity maker that compel
members of the group to restore the medieval interpretation of the Quran. In doing so,
members of the group selectively make references to the Quran and Hadith to justify their
terrorist acts, even at the peril of their own lives (Maharajh, 2017).
The use of some Quranic verses to endorse the use of violence as justification to
kill, maim, and destroy properties indiscriminately is therefore in line with the Salafist
Jihadist ideology (Gray & Adeakin, 2015; Rich & Conduit, 2015; Shuaibu et al., 2015).
The tactics used by the BHT group to achieve its objectives provide interesting insights
into the link between the radical jihadist ideology and terrorism. However, there are gaps
in the literature that did not clarify how the jihadist radical ideologues influence the
resilience exhibited by the group.
Schmid (2017) conceded that it was difficult to measure the ideological
motivation of terrorist since it was not feasible to administer any survey to terrorists.
However, an important characteristic of every terrorist group is their strict adherence to
their ideology. Moreover, the process of the indoctrination of members is a common
feature that resonates with the radical Jihadist ideology and the nature of terrorism
exhibited by the BHT group in Northern Nigeria. Such a process of ideological
indoctrination that links terrorism to the Salafist Jihadist philosophy has 4 functions
(Moghadam, 2009).
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The first function is the sensitization process of the less privileged minority group
who are impacted by the extreme social injustice, social-political exclusion, and
economic hardships due to widespread corruption (Salaam, 2012; Adebayo, 2014).
Historically, the existing poverty and economic deprivation in the northern part of
Nigeria provides a fertile ground for imbibing such a narrative. Jihadist terrorists
therefore employ political strategies and reformist actions to take advantage of the
situation.
The second function of the ideological indoctrination is the strategy of blaming
the ruling government for the hardship being experienced and to depict minority groups
as victims of unfair treatment (Braddock & Horgan, 2016). A perception of repression
and injustice by the government is often invoked by Boko Haram members to garner
sympathy and support for their cause. The Nigerian government’s employment of brutal
military force as a preferred strategy against Boko Haram has, therefore, rather worked to
the advantage of the BHT group.
As noted by Amnesty International (2015), the Nigerian government’s choice of a
repressive approach that has been characterized by the indiscriminate killing of suspected
Boko Haram members had become a source of contention between human rights
organizations and the Nigerian government. As a result, the American government had to
suspend the sale of critical military armament to the government of Nigeria to help fight
Boko Haram.
Closely connected to the second function is the third which attempts to create a
group identity by exploiting existing differences to isolate those who do not belong to this
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group. For this function, the BHT group often identify themselves as the “Army of Allah
or Muhammad” and label those who did not belong to their way of thinking as enemies or
infidels (Ball, Dagger, & O’Neill, 2016). The last function of ideological orientation is to
adopt an approach to remedy the predicament of the minority by instigating a change.
The BHT group is currently advocating for this type of change in a bid to create an
Islamic state in Northeast Nigeria to bring together localities such as Toshiya, Yunusari,
and Kannama all in the Yobe State.
The link between radical jihadist ideology and terrorism in Northern Nigeria
further extends beyond ideological inspirations. The existing acrimony between Muslims
and Christians in Northern Nigeria was also identified as an important factor that drives
the link between radical jihadist ideology and acts of terrorism in Northern Nigeria. This
situation has led to numerous clashes in the form of terrorist attacks from radical Jihadist
and reprisals attacks from their Christian counterparts. The 1994 violence in Yola in
Northern Nigerian towns where about 700 lives were lost and several public
properties including mosques and churches destroyed, is an example that establishes
the link between radical jihadist ideology and acts of terrorism (Okafor, 2014; Rufai,
2017).
Furthermore, the relationship between the radical jihadist ideology and acts of
terrorism in Northern Nigeria is defined by the lack of social justice in the country. Due
to the economic disparity and widespread poverty in that part of the country, the radical
jihadists’ movements appeal to the unemployed youth, the poor, and the marginalized
Muslims (Falola, 1998). Adesoji (2011) further posited that the radical religious
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beliefs and political patronage of religion are the underlying factors that sustain the
growth of terrorism.
Tonwe and Eke (2013) supported this assertion and posited that the roots of
terrorism were as a result of the economic and social woes experienced by the
Muslim populations. Another reason is that some Muslim elites have embraced
democracy and modernity to the detriment of Islamic ideals. Sampson (2016)
suggested that the radical jihadist ideology is constructed around grievances that resonate
with the people. It is in this light that Boko Haram was using the grievances of people as
an excuse to justify their acts of terrorism. The situation is further aggravated by the
presence of a large pool of unemployed and uneducated youth whose societal grievances
makes them vulnerable to terrorist manipulation and exploitation. This is why Nigeria’s
current counterterrorism strategies against Boko Haram have to be reinvigorated to make
them more comprehensive and robust.
Current Counter Terrorist Strategies against Boko Haram
Hakeem (2017) considered counterterrorism strategies to be the measures
employed by inter-governmental organizations and countries to mitigate future terrorist
attacks and proactively take actions to forestall and nullify the activities of terrorists.
However, there are contesting views on why current counterterrorism strategies against
the BHT group have not been successful. Sampson (2015) argued that, unless
signiﬁcant governance and political reforms are implemented to reverse the disparities in
the socioeconomic situation in Northern Nigeria, the Boko Haram phenomenon will
continue to trouble the country.
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Other literature opined that the inadequacies of the government’s counterterrorism
responses against Boko Haram were the underlying reasons for the group’s invincibility
(Gray & Adeakin, 2015). Certainly, the counterterrorism strategies of various Nigerian
governments since 2010 have rather exacerbated the Boko Haram phenomenon as the
group’s deadly attacks across the country had continued unabated.
Historically, the government of Nigerian had always used brutal military force for
counterterrorism issues. It is therefore not surprising that various governments’ responses
to the BHT group have been predominantly military (David, et al., 2015; Gray, 2018).
This was the mindset that informed the decision by then President Jonathan Goodluck to
approve a military crackdown as a national strategy to counter Boko Haram and halt the
growing terrorism in the country (Leach, 2016).
Ironically, the military’s heavy-handedness approach against the group has only
caused many civilian lives. Solomon (2015) concurred that the state-centric and militaryfocused nature of Nigeria’s counterterrorism initiatives was a major reason for the failure
to defeat Boko Haram. The use of this counterterrorism approach by the state remains a
contradiction considering the fact that it was the failures of the state itself that created the
Boko Haram problem in the first place.
A comparison can be drawn from President Goodluck Jonathan’s
counterterrorism strategy for combating terrorism with what was established by President
G. W. Bush after the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States. The adaption of a national
counterterrorism strategy by the government of Nigeria to counter the Boko Haram threat
is similar to the U.S. Patriot Act which has also not been too successful. The ambiguity of
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the militaristic approach espoused in the National Counter Terrorism Strategy cast doubts
as to its suitability for countering terrorism in Nigeria (Eji, 2016).
The failure of President Jonathan’s regime to defeat Boko Haram was because the
underlying factors responsible for the resilience of the group could not be identified and
neutralized (Leach, 2016; Bello, 2017). As a result, within the period 2011-2015, the
recruitment activities of Boko Haram reached its peak with an estimated fighting force
between 9,000 and 15,000 drawn from unwilling conscripts that included children
(Amnesty International, 2015; Blanchard, 2016). By the end of 2015, Boko Haram had
already taken control of at least 14 local government areas in Northern Nigeria.
Since the assumption of office in 2015 by current President Buhari, he has
expanded the military approach by removing some senior military officers deemed as
incompetent (Michael, 2018; Abubakar, 2017; Sampson, 2015). Furthermore, the
Department of State Services introduced the Perception Management Program to
rehabilitate, de-radicalize, and provide welfare packages to people who have been
exposed to the BHT group (Sampson, 2016). Operationally, some seasoned Islamic
clerics have also been employed to preach at selected radio and television stations on
moderate Islamic teachings. According to Sampson (2016) (as cited in Okereke, 2012),
the essence of this approach was to manage perceptions and counter radicalize the
vulnerable population, particularly, the youths by the BHT group.
The Nigerian government has also relied on some legislative and criminal justice
strategies to counter the Boko Haram menace. For instance, the vigorous implementation
of the Terrorism Prevention Act and the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act which were
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enacted in 2011 provided the government with additional arsenal in the form of a
criminal justice response to Boko Haram (Sampson, 2016). Though the law was intended
to ensure effective counterterrorism coordination and inter-agency cooperation in the
fight against Boko Haram, information sharing has remained limited due to inter-agency
rivalry. Besides, the mutual suspicion between the military and the judiciary have often
resulted in misunderstanding and sometimes open confrontations, thus attenuating the
effort towards defeating the BHT group.
The recent adoption of a multi-lateral process for combating Boko Haram by
forging partnerships with international, multi-lateral, and regional organizations is also an
effort in the right direction (Udounwa, 2013; Onuoha, 2014). The imperatives of such
international cooperation cannot be over-emphasized in view of the transnational
dimension of Boko Haram’s threat and its affiliations to other terrorist groups.
Already, Nigeria has signed security pacts with neighboring countries such as
Cameroun, Chad, and Niger, to cut off sources of arms imports and the free movement of
Boko Haram foot soldiers (Akpan & Ekanem, 2014; Obamamoye, 2017). In addition, the
government recently collaborated with the United Nations in Abuja to introduce and
implement the ‘Integrated Assistance on Counterterrorism’ framework. This program is a
subsidiary protocol of the United Nations Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force
(Sampson, 2016).
The lack of progress in defeating the BHT group despite these efforts attests to the
fact that the fight against the group should be more of a war of ideas. Beyond the rhetoric
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of de-radicalization, a major defect in the fight against the BHT group is the ideological
dimension which has been overlooked by various governments for far too long.
Counter-Ideology as a Strategy for Combating Jihadist Ideology
Having conceded that the Nigerian government’s approach to fighting the BHT
group was counter-productive, an all-inclusive approach that includes a form of a
counter-ideology has become a viable approach for neutralizing the group (Bizina &
Gray, 2014). Bin-Hassan & Pereire (2006) also argued that terrorism flourishes when
opportunity, motivation and capability meet. Therefore, to be able to prevent the
phenomenon of terrorism, it is imperative to eliminate the aspect of motivation which
often drives the terrorist ideology. Moreover, because terrorism is a vicious by-product of
extreme jihadist ideologies, counterterrorism efforts should be focused on ideological
responses to prevent terrorist groups from replenishing their human losses. Accordingly,
counter-ideology is currently gaining more acceptance as one of the effective options for
combating the menace of terrorism (Gunaratna & Bin- -Hassan, 2015).
Abdullah (2017) argued that counter-ideology was crucial in defeating terrorist
ideology for three reasons: firstly, it dissociates Islam from acts of terror by disabusing
the minds of Muslims from the belief that the Islamic faith approves of terrorism;
secondly, it reassures non-Muslims that the problem of terrorism cannot be attributed to
Islam; and finally, it remains a useful strategy for restoring and reintegrating already
detained terrorists back into society.
The success rate of counter-ideology strategies depends on how it is implemented
in each country. For instance, the British counter-ideology strategy is preventive in nature
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and aims at protecting people from exposing themselves to violent extremism. According
to Blackbourn & Walker (2016), the content of every counter-ideology should be based
on three focal points:
1. Unspecified indirect theological interventions that tackles misconception
about jihad.
2. Outlining an effective communication strategy that delivers the narrative that
fighting terrorism is not a war with Islam.
3. Promoting democratic values that ensures freedom of speech and the rule of
law, and the guarantee of fundamental rights of all, devoid of any persecution.
Sedgwick (2012), however, cautioned that though counter-ideology is a viable option for
defeating jihadist terrorists, it was likely to fail if the ideas espoused do not make sense to
Muslims for whom the counter-ideology was targeting. It is based on this premise that
Singapore has successfully implemented a counter-ideological response in combating the
Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group (Gunaratna & Taufiqurrohman, 2016). In support of this
approach, the Religious Rehabilitation Group, which was formed out of the Singapore
Muslim communities, was tasked to provide the counter-ideological response to the
Jemaah Islamiyah activities.
The successes chalked by the Religious Rehabilitation Group so far can be
attributed to their meticulous study of Jemaah Islamiyah’s ideology and the subsequent
provision of appropriate counter-ideological narratives to challenge the group’s
misinterpretation of Islam. In the case of Boko Haram, an improved relationship between
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the state and the Muslim clergy could serve as the engine that will eventually drive the
counter-ideological efforts to target the group’s resilience.
The Resilience of Terrorist Groups
Various scholars have contributed to the intellectual debate on why some terrorist
groups survive despite the overwhelming military counterterrorism operations by security
forces against them (Stigler, 2011; Rasmussen, 2011; Young & Dugan, 2014). So far,
most studies have focused on specific actions by the state and organizational dynamics
without providing any systematic investigation into the role of ideology in terrorist
resilience.
The central role the ideology of a terrorist group plays in its resilience is also
evident when that ideology resonates with the people. Forest (2012) claimed that the
ideology of a terrorist group has no motivating power unless it resonates within the
social, political, and historical context of those who support the group. Belcher (2007)
also posited that popular support is a critical requirement that enable terrorists to avoid
surveillance, detection, and elimination.
Terrorist groups often take advantage of existing grievances and the prevalence of
local conditions to justify the group’s rationale for using violence as a means for
mitigating those grievances. The resonance of Boko Haram’s ideology with its
community members provides the compelling basis for its maintenance of organizational
resilience despite the sustained military operations against them (Petersen, 2001; Scott,
2004; Jordan, 2014). Such organizational resilience is manifested in the local support
enjoyed by the BHT group that enables the group to recruit more fighters, raise funds,
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obtain essential resources, and maintain ideological relevance amongst the local
communities as a means of sustaining their cause (Ramsay, 2007).
Moreover, Johnson (2009) argued that the nature of government’s responses to
terrorism often determined whether or not terrorists can gain the support of the wider
populace. It is obvious that the heavy-handed counterterrorism tactics of the security
forces of Nigeria against the BHT group had backfired and rather helped the group to
mobilize greater support from the local communities. Jordan (2014) agreed that military
operations against terrorist groups make them resilient and explained such operations end
up increasing the local support for the terrorists.
Summary
This chapter provided a synthesis of relevant literature to elucidate the usefulness
of a counter-ideological approach as a wider strategy for defeating the BHT group. The
literature reinforced the contentious nature that Islam emerged in Northern Nigeria,
consequently leading to religious bigotry and the emergence of Jihadist Salafist
movements such as Boko Haram.
The literature also supported the idea that the ideology of the BHT group is
aligned to the radical Salafist jihadist philosophy. However, there were gaps regarding
how the ideology can be exploited by terrorist groups given that Boko Haram has been
successful in using the ideology of the radical Salafist jihadist to sustain the resilience of
the group.
The use of some Quranic verses as justification for killing indiscriminately
resonates with the Salafist Jihadist ideology and is a tactic that has often been employed
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by the BHT group. The link between radical jihadist ideology and terrorism in Northern
Nigeria however extends beyond ideological inspiration to include the lack of social
justice in Northern Nigeria. The gaps identified in the literature regarding the use of
counter-ideology as a viable strategy for defeating the resilience of the BHT group
formed the bases of the discourse in the research methodology presented in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The current difficulties confronting the government of Nigeria in defeating the
resilience of the BHT group have created the need for appropriate strategies to combat
the group. Because terrorist motivation is often driven by their ideology, it is also
important to understand how the BHT group uses its ideology to sustain its activities.
Thus, this study was concentrated on counter-ideological responses that will contribute to
combating the phenomenon of terrorism in general and the BHT group in particular. This
in-depth inquiry may provide decision makers with alternative counterterrorism strategies
beyond the current military approaches against the BHT group.
To accomplish the purpose of the study, I conducted interviews that addressed the
research question and themes in the literature review. The interview questions focused on
the aspects of the ideology of Boko Haram that is responsible for the group’s resilience
and were designed to provide answers to the research question. This approach facilitated
the discovery of additional insights into the usefulness of embracing an ideological
response in the fight against the BHT group.
Study Design and Rationale
Every study must conform to an overall design to reflect the rigor in the methods
and procedures used in collecting and analyzing data to answer a specific research
problem. Relying on the experience of individuals, this research offered a counterideology approach to enhance the Nigerian government’s effort in dealing decisively with
the Boko Haram security challenges. The research is thus phenomenological in nature
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and it described the lived experiences of the individuals who have either fought against
the BHT group or experienced the group’s atrocities. I also sought to determine the extent
to which counter-ideology strategies could be used to defeat the resilience of the BHT
group. The choice of a phenomenological qualitative approach was based on the idea that
the resilience of the BHT group can best be appreciated from the perspectives of those
who have been actively engaged in the implementation of various strategies aimed at
defeating the group. Therefore, using a phenomenological approach facilitated a better
understanding of the reasons why there is a lack of progress in defeating the BHT group
and the reasons behind the resilience of the group.
The unit of analysis for this research consisted of the BHT group and individuals
who through their shared experience were able to relate to the source of the resilience of
the group despite the military operations against it. The study further relied on individual
experiences relating to how the ideology of Boko Haram has influenced the resilience of
the group. This study clarified the nature of the resilience of the BHT group and how
counter-ideology can be utilized to defeat the group.
Role of the Researcher
A researcher’s role is central to every study as the researcher gathers, organizes,
and analyzes the perceptions of people in the research process. The accuracy of the
qualitative researcher is also based on the level of sensitivity associated with the
collection, viewing, analyzing, and reporting on the research data (Burkholder et al.,
2016). In this research, I used interview protocols to gather the relevant data throughout
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the process. I also relied on appropriate documents and archival records in compiling the
report for this study.
Furthermore, I adopted the observer–participant role because it was the most
appropriate and ethical approach for the research (Burkholder et al., 2016). This approach
resonated with the emphasis I placed on the process of collecting data in the study instead
of concentrating on the activities being observed (see Fields & Kafai, 2009). The
approach also helped to mitigate the negative impact that my interpretations might have
unintentionally introduced during the process of researching, given my military
background.
Additionally, my role involved addressing biases. The questions researchers ask
during an interview depend on their thought processes and may be influenced by inherent
biases (Dibley, 2011; Fields & Kafai, 2009). Declaring my biases upfront was therefore
an important step for collecting valid and reliable data from participants. The data were
then analyzed through a process of content analysis that was based on a thorough
assimilation of the text data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). As a way of further mitigating
possible biases, I gave participants the opportunity to review my results after the research
was concluded. Furthermore, I was also mindful not to infringe on the ethical
requirements contained in the University of Walden’s Institutional Review Board (IRB)
form. To adhere to the requirement of optional participation in this research, participants
were formally invited to share their insights in the study.
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Methodology
Population and Sample Frame
Sampling a target population from which to gather data is necessary because it is
impossible to collect data from everyone within the study area. In this study, the sample
population comprised Muslim clerics, military personnel directly involved in the battle
against BHT, and local community leaders within the study area (see Figure 1). This
strategy was based on a specific number of participants who shared their insights and
provided quality data to help explain in detail, the phenomenon under study (Burkholder
et al., 2016).

Figure 1. Map showing the study area.
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Sampled participants were based on the snowballing technique, which relied on a
chain referral process to target individuals who have in-depth knowledge of the
phenomenon under investigation (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This process allowed for
referrals from initial participants who had the expertise and showed similar traits of
interest in the subject of the study. My choice of this sampling method was because the
initial participants were limited to a small group, which made it easier for them to
recommend other potential participants who met the participatory criteria (see Schwandt,
2015).
Participant Selection
Participants interviewed in this study were selected based on their experience,
knowledge, and expertise on the research topic. The selection of participant from the
Islamic clergy, community leaders, and military personnel to participate in the process
also allowed me to obtain multiple perceptions and divergent views of the phenomenon.
A letter was forwarded to the Nigerian Armed Forces Command and Staff College to
seek permission for the military personnel to participle in the study. Participants
completed an acceptance slip, which was returned to me before the interviews
commenced.
Sample Size
A total of 20 participants were interviewed. Initially two participants from each
category of the sample frame were invited to participate in the interview. I then relied on
the snowballing technique for referrals from the initial participants. Through this process,
the sample size was systematically increased to 20 participants and achieved a saturation
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level in providing varying perspectives on how counter-ideology strategies could be
initiated to defeat the resilience of the BHT group. In addition to the saturation level, this
sample size was also dictated by triangulating the interview data with secondary archival
documents to further deepen my insight into how counter-ideology could be used as a
counterterrorism strategy in defeating the resilience of the BHT group. A summary of
the sample space selection process according to the category of participants is at Table 1.
Table 1
Sample Space Selection Process
Category of Participants

Initial Participants
Recruited

Recruitment through
Snowballing

Totals

Military Personnel

2

5

7

Community Leaders

2

4

6

Muslim Clerics

2

5

7

Totals

6

14

20

Data Collection Process
The data collection process of this research was based on multiple sources. The
process also focused on gaining insights into understanding how to counter the ideology
of the BHT group as a mean to defeat the group’s resilience. In line with this, I collected
data from interviews, documents, and archival records.
Interviews. Interviewing requires a dynamic strategy for collecting rich
qualitative data. In qualitative studies, the interviewer directs the interaction with
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participants and provides participants with the opportunity to clarify any information in
the interviews (Babbie, 2007). Given the nature of this study, individual, face-to-face
interviews were appropriate because I sought to derive themes from the experiences of
participants.
An interview can be structured, semi structured, or unstructured, with each of
these forms being progressively less rigid in the questioning (Burkholder et al., 2016). I
used a semi structured interview format in this study because it is typically employed in
qualitative research. Semi structured interviews involve constructing interview protocols
that are linked to the research question(s) (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). Semi structured
interviews also allow the researcher to anticipate probes during the interview and further
explore participant’s responses. In this study, I posed initial questions and followed them
up with further questions derived from the initial answers to gather additional relevant
information. Before the interviews, potential participants were asked to complete a
consent form to indicate their readiness or otherwise to participate in the study.
Because interviewing relies on a clear set of questions, the questions should be
designed to achieve the desired effectiveness. Interview protocols ensure consistency
across an interview by guiding the interviewer (Josselson, 2013). An interview protocol
includes a preamble, closing remarks, and the questions to be asked (Creswell, 2007).
The name of interviewee, date and time of the interview, location of the interview, and
any other relevant details should also be indicated in the preambles (Creswell, 2007). The
interview protocol in this study provided a guide for conducting the interviews with the
participants (see Appendix). The interview questions were the same for the Muslim
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clerics, community leaders, and the military personnel and was structured this way to
obtain varied insights into the study phenomenon.
Documents and archival data. There is a distinction between data collected from
interviews and those gathered through documentation (Trochim & Donnelly, 2007). Prior
to using documents and archival data, researchers must first assess and analyze the
relevance and appropriateness of the documents before extracting its content. Documents
relied on this study were therefore appraised according to four criteria: authenticity,
credibility, representativeness, and meaning (Scott, 2006).
It is possible for the authenticity of documents featuring competent authors to be
doubtful. In other instances, such materials may not produce a faithful explanation of
their scholarly works and could be intentionally altered either for dubious motives or
merely by inexperience. Moreover, qualitative data obtained may appear genuine but still
be distorted. Such infractions in documents to be relied on in a research could also be a
reflection of the author’s biases. To offset this in the study, I ensured the authenticity and
accuracy of materials used were appraised to determine their suitability. I also constantly
ascertained the motives of authors to determine possible distortions in their materials, if
any, before utilizing them.
I ensured the credibility of the documentary data collected for this study by
assessing the intellectual rigor in those materials before using them. Interestingly, Scott
(2006) averred that determining representativeness of documents could be a difficult
venture for researchers. I also paid attention to issues of generalization and reliability by

46
using a pragmatic approach of triangulation and documentation which is similar to the
criteria of validity in qualitative studies.
A final criterion I relied on in assessing the documents and archival data used in
this research was ‘meaning’. I achieved this by ensuring that the textual analyses of
documents available were evidence based, clear, and comprehensive. In addition, I
conducted inter-textual examination of materials to ensure that the contents of documents
used were suitable within the historical setting of the study (Hill, 1993; Austin & de Jong,
2008).
Quality Assurance of the Research Process
Quality concerns played a central role from the commencement, data collection,
through to the analysis and interpretation of the findings in this study (Ali & Yusof,
2011). I also employed responsible decision-making skills to ensure the quality of the
study. Because quality assurance in qualitative research sometimes extends beyond the
responsibilities for decision making, I ensured that the methodology followed throughout
the research process was appropriate. Moreover, I made sure the phenomenon under
study was truthfully recorded (Cook & Campbell, 1979; LeCompte & Goetz, 1982).
Burkholder et al., (2016) posited that researchers can also ensure quality in
phenomenological studies by addressing concepts that reflect the actual phenomenon
being researched instead of focusing on the limitations of the study design. Throughout
the research process, I focused on incorporating strategies that guaranteed rigor in quality
(Reynolds et al., 2011). I also relied on the characteristics of the trustworthiness that
addressed issues of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.

47
Credibility
Lincoln & Guba (1985) indicated that an important criterion for establishing
trustworthiness and rigor in every research is to ensure credibility. To ensure credibility
in this research, I focused on presenting an accurate account of the phenomenon under
study. Similarly, Kirk & Miller (1986) cautioned that the credibility of a study is
compromised by errors when the response of participants to questions is given to satisfy a
favored social response instead of a reflection of a personal experience. To mitigate this
and promote the accuracy in this research, I established an early cultural awareness of the
study environment by studying the backgrounds of potential participants and
organizations even before the data collection process begun. This gave me an insight into
the type of participants and organization I was going to engage.
Another approach that guaranteed credibility in this study was the honest manner
I engaged participants who provided the data. Every potential participant I approached in
this study was given the opportunity to either accept or decline participation. A letter of
consent as already alluded to was therefore made available to every participant to
endorse. This ensured that participants genuinely took part in the study without any form
of compulsion.
Transferability
Transferability in this study was achieved by providing details of the conditions
and settings under which the ﬁeldwork for the research was undertaken. This approach
provides readers with the opportunity to determine whether the findings of future
researches under similar settings to this study environment, would lead to similar
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ﬁndings. Thus, I provided sufﬁcient contextual details about the research area especially,
where the ﬁeldwork was carried out to enable readers make such inferences. Shenton
(2004), however, cautioned that trustworthiness is not necessarily compromised even
when a similar inquiry produces results that are inconsistent with other works. Rather,
Shenton said this should be considered as a reﬂection of multiple realities emanating
from the phenomenon under study and an endorsement of dependability.
Dependability
Krefting (1991) confirmed that qualitative studies are considered dependable
based on the consistency of the findings of the research. Though, meeting this criterion is
difﬁcult, researchers must always strive to ensure that the results of their studies are
consistent with those of future researchers investigating the same phenomenon. In this
study, dependability was addressed directly by reporting in detail the processes involved
in the study to enable future researchers repeat similar inquiries and achieve comparable
results.
Confirmability
As the last benchmark of trustworthiness in this study, I ensured confirmability of
this study by making sure that the findings were derived from the participant’s
experience, instead of my own perception. In other words, I demonstrated that the
ﬁndings of the study were derived from the research data rather than from my biases. The
technique of reflexivity was also used in this study to establish the confirmability by
maintaining a written record of the decisions I made in the course of the research. The
record of my reflections on the research process regarding my values and interests as
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documented in the reflexive journal reduced the impact of my biases if any, on the
research design, data collection, and analysis (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993; Onwuegbuzie
& Johnson, 2006; Nakkula & Ravitch, 1998).
Researcher’s Bias
The risk of bias from a researcher exists in all components of qualitative research
and could affect a study if not addressed properly. My biases in this study were
minimized by ensuring that during the interview process, I posed questions in a manner
that encouraged participants to narrate their feelings. Throughout the interview, I also
refrained from making any interjections of my personal perspectives regarding the
phenomenon under scrutiny. To further reduce bias, I subjected the findings in the study
through the process of triangulation to ensure the results conformed to other sources.
Schwandt (2015) agreed that the central point of the triangulation process is to scrutinize
a conclusion from more than one perspective.
Ethical Considerations
The interaction between researchers and participants in research work makes the
research process ethically challenging for researchers because of their personal
involvement in the process. In qualitative research, ethical guidelines are primarily
focused on protecting research participants and adhering to the guiding principles of
respect for persons, beneficence, and justice (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015).
Respect for persons. A qualitative research such as this study often involves an
interaction between the researcher and human subjects. The autonomy, decision-making,
and dignity of participants must therefore be respected. In this study, I adhered to the
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requirements spelt out in the Walden University IRB to protect the rights of participants
in the research. The IRB approval number for this study is 03-22-19-0591432. By
subjecting myself to the IRB, I also provided protection for Walden University against
any potential legal implications that might be caused by any unethical behavior on my
part in the course of the research.
Additionally, the participants voluntarily consented to taking part in this research.
These actions guaranteed that all the participants who took part in the research did so
based on their own volition and were also fully aware of the procedures of the research
including the potential risks involved (Denzin & Giardina, 2016).
Beneficence. The utility and value of beneficence is achieved in an ethical
research by providing some benefits to the participants to balance the benefits that will
accrue against risks (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). In this study, beneficence was a
source of concern for Muslim clerics because they were confronted with multiple
responsibilities of defending their faith and at the same time had to criticize the BHT
group. Fortunately, the risks involved in this research did not exceed what normally
confronts them in their daily lives. I therefore maximized the benefits of the research
against the risk imposed on participants by respecting their wishes. For example, in
instances where participants did not wish to answer particular questions, they were
allowed to do so. As a result, the emotional well-being of participants was considered as
an overriding factor despite the quest for rich data.
Justice. Allowing participants to narrate their experiences in a research is a
justice issue. It is so because the researchers’ understanding of the phenomenon being
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investigated is based on a fair assessment of participant’s experience. The researcher and
participants’ relationship therefore pose a challenge in qualitative research as the
personality of the researcher can influences the manner data is collected.
For instance, deriving meaning from the accounts of the experiences of the
participants could be misunderstood and end up not producing the quality of the
information required. To address the challenge in this study, participants were offered a
fair and equitable distribution of burdens and benefits. Accordingly, participants from
vulnerable populations were not exploited in any way throughout the research process
(De Chesnay & Anderson, 2019).
Summary
In this chapter, the study area, the role of the researcher, and the research
methodology, were examined. The criterion for recruiting the study participants, data
collection, ethical procedures, and limitations relating to the study was also explained.
The design further established the rigor in the methods and procedures used to collect the
data. Consequently, this qualitative research study was framed in a phenomenological
approach that described the lived experiences of individuals relating to using counterideology as a counterterrorism strategy to defeat the resilience of the BHT group.
Interview schedules, the assessment of relevant documents and archival records
were employed in the research process. The collection of data was done through the
snowballing sampling technique. A clearly defined population sample comprised Muslim
clerics, military personnel directly involved in the battle against BHT, and community
leaders in Muslim communities within Northern Nigeria. The establishment of
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trustworthiness in this study was underpinned by ensuring credibility, transferability,
dependability, and confirmability.
The ethics of the research also conformed to the appropriate ethical guidelines for
the protection of the research participants throughout. The guiding principle of not
harming anyone in the research process was further addressed. In Chapter 4, I presented
the results of the study.

53
Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to develop a counter-ideology strategy
as a response to the activities of BHT group. This was important because of the
increasingly ideological motivation of the BHT group and the ineffective military
approach against the group. Interviews were conducted to elicit the shared experiences of
20 participants comprising Muslim clergy, Muslim community leaders, and military
personnel who have fought against the BHT group. The study helped interrogate the
group’s belief, which is underpinned by the ideological narrative that all the
sociopolitical ills and economic problems confronting Muslims in contemporary Nigeria
can be eliminated by applying rigid Islamic norms in line with sharia laws. This research
may constitute an appropriate framework for developing policies to counter the
ideologies of terrorist groups. The results can thus meet the needs of counterterrorism
practitioners, policy makers, and general readers. The study can also serve as a source of
reference material for combating terrorism using counter-ideology strategies.
The chapter includes a discussion of the research setting and participants’
demographics followed by the process of data collection and analysis. Evidence of
trustworthiness is also highlighted. The results of the interviews are then presented
including how the findings emerged from the data. A summary of the chapter is also
provided.
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Research Setting
The research was conducted within physical, social, and cultural locations that
reflected participants’ natural settings. This approach allowed me to focus on making
meaning from the participants’ views within their environment. The study setting
comprised nine states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Yobe and Taraba, Kano,
Jigawa, and Kaduna States. The social settings of these states included poverty and
unemployment that directly related to the emergence of Boko Haram in Northeastern
Nigeria. The influences of cultural and religious factors and the socioeconomic
discontents in parts of Northern Nigeria have also been cited as some of the reasons for
the North-South/Muslim-Christian divides in Nigeria. These complex factors are the
main factors that influence Boko Haram’s continuous existence. Through a
phenomenological investigation into this complex sociocultural phenomenon, I collected
data in the natural setting of the participants and subjected the data to content analysis to
establish themes.
Demographics
I interviewed 20 participants pooled from different backgrounds. The background
of participants included community leaders, Muslim clerics, and military personnel who
have fought against the BHT group. All participants were Nigerians and their ages ranged
between 20-59 years. Most participants fell within the range of 40-49 years (40%).
Participants were also of diverse religious backgrounds, with 50 % representing Muslims,
30 % representing Christians, and 20 % belonging to other religious orientation. The
diverse religious backgrounds provided varying perspectives of the phenomenon under
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study and enhanced robust data analysis and interpretation of the results. Most
participants were married (60 %), and there was an even distribution of education levels,
though 15% did not have any formal education. All participants were assigned nicknames
to ensure their confidentiality. Table 2 shows the demographic characteristics of study
participants.
Table 2
Demographic Characteristics of Participants
Description

Frequency

Percentage

Valid percentage Cumulative
percentage

20-29

4

20

20

20

30-39

6

30

30

50

40-49

8

40

40

90

50-59

2

10

10

100

60 and above

0

0

0

100

Single

4

20

20

20

Marred

12

60

60

80

Divorced/separated 4

20

20

100

Other

0

0

0

100

Christian

6

30

30

30

Islam

10

50

50

80

Traditional

4

20

20

100

Other

0

0

0

100

Age

Marital status

Religion
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Educational background
Primary

5

25

25

25

Secondary

5

25

25

50

Diploma/NCE

2

10

10

60

Degree/HND

5

25

25

85

No education

3

15

15

100

(table continues)

Data Collection
Participants were stratified into three groups made up of Muslim clerics,
community leaders, and military personnel. The number of participants initially projected
to take part in the study was about 30. However, 10 participants did not avail themselves
to be interviewed even though they had earlier on agreed to do so. The first participants
for each category were recruited through an invitation letter. Thereafter, the snowballing
technique was used to garner additional participants. There was no potential threat to the
Muslim clerics and community leaders, as the interviews took place in the comfort and
safety of their homes. Similarly, the interview for the military personnel took place at the
Nigerian Armed Forces Command and Staff College in Kaduna-Jaji, an environment that
also guaranteed the safety of the participants.
Before engaging participants for the interviews, I gave them the opportunity to
complete a consent form, which emphasized the confidential and voluntary nature of the
study. Most participants subsequently indicated their interest within 4 days of being
informed about the study and were further given a week to reflect on their decision to
participate in the study. The completed consent forms were retrieved from them and the
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interviews was scheduled based on participant’s preferred locations and timeframes. Each
interview lasted at most an hour-and-a-half, which allowed participants to express their
thoughts thoroughly.
Before each interview session, I introduced myself and confirmed the identity of
participants. As part of my introductory remarks, I expressed my gratitude to them for
responding positively to the invitation to participate in the study. Then I took time to go
over the consent form with participants to reinforce the confidential nature of the study. I
informed participants of their right to withdraw from the study at any stage of the process
and also assured them that their identities will not be retained in any future publication of
the study. To ensure that participants stayed focused during the interview process, I
reviewed the interview protocol, the research question, and the purpose of the study with
each participant before commencing the interview. Additionally, I informed all
participants about my intention to use a voice recorder during the interview. I explained
to participants that using the voice recorder ensured that their thoughts were accurately
captured in the data analysis. None of the participants objected to the recording of the
interviews.
Participants were also assured of the respect for their feeling. For instance, I
informed them to freely express their feeling, especially if they felt uncomfortable about
answering a question or did not wish to answer a question. Though the interviews were
conducted with the interview protocol, I also used probes to elicit additional insights from
the participants as they shared their experiences. At the end of each interview, I thanked
participants and informed them of a possible follow-up meeting if necessary. Afterwards,
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I transcribed the interviews using NVivo 12 software to analyze the content and the
information was saved as Microsoft word documents. The transcripts were subsequently
reviewed, and the main recurrent themes identified.
I used a system of back-ups to store the data. This was to ensure that the safety of
the research documents was protected from possible losses caused by any software or
hardware failure and malicious virus attacks. Soft copies were also duplicated and stored
on various flash drives. Furthermore, computer files that contained identifiable data were
arranged in a hierarchical structure of files and grouped in identifiable folders. The
locations of all electronic data were also subjected to strict protective protocols by
restricting access to files and folders using passwords accessible only to me. Hard copies
of the research papers and data collected in the forms of interview notes and audio tapes
were kept secured in a locked filing cabinet that was only accessible to me.
As is the case in most interviews, difficulties were encountered during the data
collection stage of this study. One of the problems was the inability of some participants
to understand the English language. This affected the data gathering process despite the
use of a translator. For participants who could read and write, I observed in several
instances that some of them felt embarrassed and avoided eye contact with me because of
their inability to understand some key words in the interview protocol. This may have
created a sense of inadequacy for them during the interactions. I therefore made efforts to
reassure them to make them comfortable. The security situation within the geographical
area of study also presented some difficulties in the data collection process. This was
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evident in the instances where some potential participants were reluctant to cooperate and
share information.
Data Analysis
The data were first converted into a textual form using NVivo 12 software, which
was in line with the methodology described in Chapter 3. Thereafter, I transcribed the
data gathered from the responses to the interview questions. I also reflected on the
meaning of the data retrieved to develop an understanding from each participant’s
perspectives.
Before organizing the data, I read through the transcripts several times to
familiarize myself with the details in the data. I also used marginal notes and a summary
of my field notes, as an aid to further interrogate the data. To ensure a more efficient data
analysis process, I later compressed the data into meaningful segments leading to the
discovery of the central themes. The 10 questions in the research interview protocol that
produced the themes and subthemes were asked in the order specified in Section C of the
appendix to this study.
Responses from the 20 participants were put together according to corresponding
question numbers and stored in their respective designated folders. For instance, all the
responses to Question 1 by the 20 participants were collated and stored in the folder
named “Responses to Question 1.” The same process was replicated for the other nine
questions and the responses stored in their respective folders. Each folder was then
scrutinized for the identification of phrases that related to the research question. For
example, with Nvivo software, several common phrases emerged from Question 1, which
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was related to how the ongoing campaign by the security forces against Boko Haram has
contributed in sustaining the group’s popular support. Some of the common phrases
included “they sympathize with the activities of insurgents.” Another phrase that featured
prominently was “A key factor that undermines the government’s counterterrorism
efforts.” Other phrases included “abject poverty,” “economic inequality and social
marginalization,” and “youth bulge.”
The second interview question was related to the extent to which the resilience of
Boko Haram has been impacted by ongoing counterterrorism efforts by the Nigerian
government. Common phrases that emerged included “the oppressive counterterrorism
efforts by the Nigerian Security Forces have emboldened the group,” “aggressive
offensive against Boko Haram terrorists,” “ongoing counterterrorism efforts,” and
“changing the narrative with a counter narrative to win the heart and minds of the
populace.” Similarly, responses from remaining eight interview questions also produced
insightful common phrases.
To identify themes from these common phrases, I conducted a second and more
thorough reading of each interview transcript and secondary data collected, keeping in
mind the research question. The initial phrases identified were synthesized by harnessing
key thoughts and ideas that shared commonalities across the interviews conducted. This
process allowed for the generation of the ﬁrst set of the themes that were more deﬁned.
Using content analysis, the emerging principal themes were further segregated into
subthemes. A summary of themes and subthemes derived from the interviews conducted
are displayed in Table 3.
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Table 3
Themes and Subthemes
Themes

Subthemes

Curtailing both the
active and passive
support for BHT group





The influence the Salafist ideological narrative of the group
Fighting for a larger and aggrieved Muslim constituency
Effective Mobilizing Mechanism for support of Boko Haram

Requirement for a broad
approach for deradicalization of BHT
group



Incorporating moderate Muslim clerics in the de- radicalization
effort
Winning the hearts and minds of citizens in the North East of
Nigeria
Engaging the former Boko Haram fighters Engaging the former
Boko Haram Fighters in Negotiations




Impact of Boko Haram
activities on the socioeconomic status of
Nigeria




Boko Haram use of the

Print and Electronic

media to Garner Support

Loss of livelihoods of people living in Northeast
The socioeconomic disparities between the North and South of
Nigeria
Government use of social media to counter Boko Haram Ideology
Engaging the community using social media for counter-ideology

The identified themes and subthemes were then tabulated and the data stored in
individual theme folders. Keeping track and organizing data from participants’ responses
this way was beneficial in analyzing the results of the study which added credibility to
the analysis of the data (Saldana, 2015).
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Credibility
I used triangulation from additional and different data sources to promote
conﬁdence in the accuracy of this research and ensure credibility. This strategy enabled
me to attain a complete understanding of the phenomenon being studied and made the
research findings comprehensive and well developed (Noble & Smith, 2015). Another
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approach that guaranteed the credibility of this study was the fact that participants took
part in the study without any form of compulsion. The credibility of a study can be
tainted when the responses to questions from participants’ are given to satisfy a desired
social response rather than as a reflection of a personal experience of the phenomena
being investigated (Kirk & Miller, 1986). Using member checking, I shared the results of
the data, its interpretations, and conclusions with the participants, and they certified that
their thoughts and intentions were captured accurately.
Transferability
I provided adequate contextual details about the research area where the ﬁeldwork
was carried out. This gives the readers the opportunity to determine whether the existing
study environment is similar to other situations and whether the ﬁndings from this study
are applicable to those settings. In addition, I described the phenomenon under study in
sufficient details to enable readers evaluate the extent to which the conclusions drawn are
transferable to other settings, situations, and people (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Lincoln &
Guba, 1985).
Dependability
The detailed description of the processes involved in this study is to ensure
dependability and enable future researchers to repeat similar inquiries and achieve
comparable results. I also relied on the audit technique to establish dependability in this
study. This audit technique was used by inviting another researcher who was not involved
in the research process to examine both the process and product of the research study
(Creswell, 2013: Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Lincoln & Guba further stated that the essence
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of this was to evaluate the accuracy of the process of the research and determine whether
or not the findings, interpretations and conclusions drawn were supported by the data.
Moreover, I described in detail the processes involved in the study so that future
researchers can repeat similar inquiries in different settings and still produce comparable
results.
Confirmability
I relied on my reflexive journal to establish confirmability in this study. The
journal contained records of my reflections regarding the study and all the events that
happened in the field. The personal reflections captured the background, my perceptions,
and interests on the research process. I also demonstrated that the ﬁndings of the study
were derived from the research data rather than from my biases.
Results
This section reports the results of the study based on the research question and the
analysis of the data collected. The research question was: To what extent can counterideology strategies be instituted to defeat the BHT group? The identities of participants
were concealed to protect their confidentiality. The ensuing analysis of the themes and
sub-themes were derived from the data collected and are based on my interpretations of
the shared experiences of participants.
Theme 1: Active and Passive Support for Members of Boko Haram Terrorist Group
Boko Haram enjoys local sympathy and support from the ranks of the uneducated,
unemployed, and impoverished youth in Northern Nigeria. The effect of this support has
continuously offset the superiority of the Nigerian Security Forces in the field.
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Participants observed that the public support enjoyed by Boko Haram typically relied on
both active and passive elements within the population in Northeast of Nigeria.
Unlike the active supporters, passive supporters do not make personal sacrifices in
the form of suicide attacks. Instead, they only sympathize with the activities of the group
because they considered the members of the group as part of the local community. The
unwillingness of the local populace to betray Boko Haram members was therefore a
contributing factor to the resilience of the group against the government’s
counterterrorism efforts.
In the words of Muhammed; “The military’s indiscriminate strikes are
counterproductive regardless of immediate benefits, because they kill the local civilians
thereby alienating members of the affected communities.” Counterterrorism efforts
against BHT group should be hinged on counter-ideology strategies that focus at gaining
the support of the population in the Northeast of Nigeria instead of alienating them by
relying solely on military operations.
John suggested that the military should avoid the indiscriminate destruction of
lives and properties and rather preserve the gains made thus far. These can be achieved
by preventing reprisals attacks from Boko Haram, stabilizing liberated towns and
villages, and rebuilding them. Furthermore, Danladi complained that the combat
operations to evict Boko Haram from Northeast of Nigeria had inflicted unimaginable
high level of casualties on civilians causing resentment towards the Nigerian Security
Forces:
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Almost a decade of military operations has only resulted in mass displacement of
people, destruction of properties, loss of harvests, and further tarnishing of the
honor and dignity of many innocent people who are falsely accused of being
Boko Haram collaborators.
In Hassan’s view, any counter-ideology strategy to defeat the BHT group in
Northeast of Nigeria should be based on gaining the support of the local people.
However, he said, “the deprivation of large segments of the population in Northeast of
Nigeria and the oppressive counterterrorism approach by government has worsened the
socio-economic plights of the people.” This situation has created a fertile ground for the
resentment of the Nigerian Security Forces and invariably strengthened BHT group’s
capacity to mobilize mass support amongst the local population.
Abdulai expressed similar sentiments and stated that “A key factor frustrating the
government’s counterterrorism efforts is the economic dislocation of the people as a
result of the military operations against Boko Haram members.” He further indicated that
existing economic inequality, social marginalization, and the youth bulge has reduced the
options available to many young Nigerians and this is one of the reasons for the apparent
support Boko Haram was enjoying from the local population.
Regardless of its lost territories, Boko Haram has shown significant staying power
by demonstrating versatility in its terrorist activities. Ali said, “this quality has made the
group a formidable threat to Nigeria’s security.” In his view, there was a limited appeal
amongst Nigerians for Boko Haram’s ideology. However, the group has been able to take
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advantage of the indiscriminate operations of the security agencies to whip up negative
sentiments against the government.
Most participants believed because of Boko Haram’s strict adherence to the
Quran even to the exclusion of the Hadith and other generally accepted secondary
sources of Islamic law, the group does not enjoy popular support among mainstream
Nigerian Muslims. Mustapha said: “The basis of this opinion was due to the group’s
wrongful appropriation of Islam for the justification of its acts of terrorism.” Johnson
stated that “there was no proof that Boko Haram commanded broad-based support among
Muslims.” He added that Boko Haram’s rhetoric was focused on two trends:
The security forces were using brutal military force to attack pious Muslims as a
way of preventing the formation of a Sharia caliphate in Northern Nigeria; and the
aggressive evangelism by Christians in the North will eventually disenfranchise
Muslims and render the creation of a Muslim state in the North impossible.
Northern Nigeria in general is confronted with many security challenges that tend to be
exploited by Boko Haram to gain public support. James acknowledged that:
The poor public safety and security, ethnic, religious, and sectarian rivalry, are
some of the challenges that have played to the advantage of Boko Haram and
made it possible for the group to solicit support for its cause from the population.
The relative importance of these challenges however, varied demographically and also
depended on the geographical location.
In the Northeast of Nigeria where Boko Haram is active, the group is exploiting
the geographical location and the demography of the area to exacerbate the situation.

67
Abdul claimed that: “By invoking Don Fodio’s jihad as cultural and historical points of
reference, Boko Haram is able to justify the use of jihad against their perceived enemies
as ‘enemies’ of Islam.” The sophisticated weaponry, vehicles, bombs and ammunition at
the disposal of Boko Haram also points to the level of financial and logistics support
available to the group. Despite the high level of poverty in Northern Nigeria, access to
financial support has helped in making the group resilient. According to Abdul . . .
“ransom monies received from kidnapping is one of the group’s primary sources of
funding. The group is also believed to be funded by Islamic terrorist groups such as ISIS
and AQIM.”
The impact of the Salafist ideological narrative on Boko Haram support. The
practical nature of Salafi-Jihadism has enhanced the strategic outlook of Boko Haram and
made the group appealing to the youth in Northern Nigeria. Salifu averred that: “Boko
Haram draws its Salafist ideological inspiration from AQIM. It is therefore not possible to
defeat the group’s ideology without first understanding their philosophy.” The fervor with
which Boko Haram fighters pursue their goals serves as an ethical framework for
soliciting the support of the youth within the areas they control. For this reason, David
said, “The military-dominated solutions in the fight against Boko Haram cannot defeat the
group because some sections among the population support the Salafist ideological
narrative.” Such support from the populace in his view has resulted in Boko Haram’s
ideological resilience.
Conventional strategies that aim at dissuading people from supporting terrorist
groups tend to presume that only ideological brainwashing drive people to voluntarily
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join these radical groups. But in the opinion of Charles, the precarious security and
political conditions in the Northeast of Nigeria are partly the reason why some
community members are compelled to support Boko Haram. He stated that: “Boko
Haram offers loyal community members some respite from the existing insecurity as part
of its Salafist ideological narrative.” Sandow conceded that Boko Haram was resilient
and adaptive. He said: “The military onslaught on the group and its Salafist ideology are
some of the reasons Boko Haram use to justify their terrorist acts against the Nigerian
state.
Fighting for the Muslim constituency. Boko Haram also portrays itself as a
defender of the Muslim constituencies in Northern Nigeria against the Nigeria State
aggression and victimization of members based on their Islamic faith. The group’s
exclusivist Salafist identity and its strategy of playing the defender of the Islamic faith
and victims of the Nigeria State have swelled up its support base amongst its ideological
adherents. Aliu noted that: “Members of the group are inspired by the belief that they are
fighting for the aggrieved Muslim constituency.”
Seidu observed that Boko Haram sympathizers were in a minority and represented
a fringe of Northern Nigeria’s Salafi community. He stated that “Boko Haram’s
resilience has been aided by the group’s ability to attract external reinforcement from
other regional terrorist groups.” Sani agreed that “The proximity of AQIM who also see
themselves as fighting for Muslims makes it easier for Boko Haram to attract the required
external support for its survival.” Ogbey further said:
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The sophisticated manner Boko Haram suicide bombers detonated a VehicleBorne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) next to the National Police
Headquarters in Abuja in 2016 points to the involvement of external support from
terrorist groups like AQIM and Al Shabaab who also consider themselves as
fighting for Muslims.
Mechanism for mobilizing resources for Boko Haram. An important reason for
the resilience of Boko Haram is the group’s ability to continuously mobilize and increase
its human and material resources. John said: “At its inception, Boko Haram’s strategy for
mobilizing forces was to recruit its fighter mostly from the gullible and misguided youths
drawn from the ranks of school dropouts and the Amajiris/ madrassas (Islamic schools)
system.” However, currently the group is also able to recruit intellectuals and strategic
leaders as members.
This position was corroborated by Kabiu who stated that: “The arrest and
subsequent conviction of a lecturer from the Kogi State University in November 2013,
for recruiting some youths into Boko Haram, is an example of Boko Haram’s ability to
recruit intellectuals and strategic leaders.” Bello also disclosed that another mechanism
the group has used to solicit support was by offering business loans to financially
desperate families. Later, he said: “Such families are coerced into supporting the group
when they are unable to repay the amount owed. The group also fund itself from ransom
monies extorted from kidnapped people.”
Besides, Boko Haram has on several occasions used its international affiliations to
attract foreign fighters. Boko Haram’s recent engagement of foreign fighters to attack
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troops’ formations in the North East of Nigeria attests to this assertion. According to
Dramani, this trend. . . “posed threats to the sub-region and requires a review of the
ongoing military operations against Boko Haram if its resilience has to be defeated.”
Theme 2: Requirement for a Broad Approach for De-radicalization of Boko Haram
Terrorist
The lack of progress by the military-based strategy in defeating Boko Haram has
necessitated the need for a more comprehensive approach to subdue the group’s
resilience. One of such initiatives which have been adopted by the Federal Government
of Nigeria in corroboration/partnership with the Nigerian Armed Forces is the deradicalization program.
Ogbey referred to Nigeria’s 2014 National Security Strategy which included
counter-radicalization, communication, and de-radicalization and indicated that the
strategy’s focus on the use of soft power to defeat Boko Haram was flawed. In his view,
“the de-radicalization aspect of the 2014 National Security Strategy was a misplaced
strategy and policymakers should review it.” He further stated that: “The program is
riddled with problems and challenges because the classification has been skewed towards
‘low-risk’ and ‘high-risk’ defectors.”
Such classification presented an obstacle to potential defectors who are not certain
of the category they will be assigned to if they defected. Abdulai, Hassan, and
Muhammed proposed a reliable process of bringing people who have been associated
with Boko Haram back to their communities as part of the de-radicalization program.
Hassan argued that:
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For displaced people to successfully return and rebuild their lives, first, social
workers and psychologists need to be sent to the communities to heal members
from the trauma they have experienced.” Thereafter, traditional and religious
leaders, such as Imams, should be engaged to prepare the community for the
arrival of the former Boko Haram associates.
This means that Former Boko Haram members should only be brought back to their
communities at the later stage of the process.
Dramani described the current Boko Haram de-radicalization program as a
laudable option to augment the ongoing military approach but has failed to defeat the
resilience of the BHT group. He however added that: “The effectiveness of the deradicalization program is fraught with problems because it is largely focused on
recidivism reduction, which in itself is difficult to measure.” Richard observed that:
“because the social dimension of the de-radicalization program has been neglected, there
is an increased tendency for the process of the re-integration of former combatants into
society to be negatively framed.”
In Nigeria, various de-radicalization initiatives have tried unsuccessfully to
support the re-integration of former combatants into society through educational support.
Salifu said the reason for this was because “the framers of the de-radicalization program
in Nigeria misunderstand de-radicalization to mean a process in which former Boko
Harm fighters reject the radical ideology they once embraced.” Ali stated that: “Full reintegration is a long-term process and requires that community needs within the
Northeast of Nigeria are taken into account.”
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Though the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) which is a community based antiBoko Haram vigilante group plays an important role in fighting the BHT group, its role in
the process of reintegrating former Boko Haram fighter has so far been negative.
Mustapha claimed that:
When former Boko Haram fighters return to their communities after the deradicalization program, they come under constant surveillance from the CJTF.
This has negative implications for the de-radicalization program insofar as
enforcing disengagement and enforcing social norms by the CJTF is concerned.
The CJTF’s scrutiny of the re-integrated former Boko Haram fighters may have reduced
the likelihood of former Boko Haram fighters to re-engage in terrorism. However, Abdul,
Seidu, and Sani were unanimous in their assessment that the CJTF’s abrasive suspicion of
former fighters and the poor discipline among them has in some cases resulted in the
killing of former combatants released from the de-radicalization program.
Abdul further criticized the manner the de-radicalization program was being
implemented. In his opinion . . . “one of the difficulties which undermine the deradicalization program is the push-back against the re-integration of the former Boko
Haram fighters.” Even though former Boko Haram fighters may have denounced
terrorism, he expressed doubt over whether those former fighters will not be
surreptitiously giving support to the group’s terrorist activities in the future.
Incorporating moderate Muslim clerics in the de-radicalization effort. The
Nigerian government’s de-radicalization program in various prisons in the country had
made significant strides in de-radicalizing former members of Boko Haram. Moderate
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Muslim clerics working in these prisons have served as intermediaries between former
fighters and the government to drive the required reforms. According to Mustapha, by
leading Friday prayers . . . “prison Muslim clerics help to change former fighters who use
extremists Salafist motifs to recruit people in the prisons.” Bello observed that, in the
prison context, “the efforts of Muslim clerics to de-radicalize former Boko Haram
fighters has a major setback because the former fighters do not see themselves as
criminals and therefore may not be repentant after all.
Despite these difficulties, the prisons still provide the right environment from
which Muslim clerics can engage individuals or group of former fighters in the deradicalization process. Kabiru stated that: “Religious re-education and vocational training
are some of the key elements that can inspire a more effective de-radicalization program
in the prisons.” Aliu emphasized the need for credible interlocutors who would relate to
the personal and psychological needs of prisoners. Sandow, Charles, and David agreed
that because Muslim clerics were expected to relate to the psychological needs of
prisoners’ during the de- radicalization process, they needed to be trained as counsellors
as well.
Johnson and Richard explained that many of former fighters who participate in
the de-radicalization program often returned to terrorism because of lack of support and
assistance from government. Richard further said: “The de-radicalization program should
make conscious efforts to facilitate the transition of former fighters into social networks
as a way of averting recidivism.” This reinforces the generally held opinion that the de-
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radicalization programs cannot be successful without considering the wider religious,
political and social context in which the program is carried out.
Siedu stated that “The over-reliance on only Muslim clerics in the deradicalization programs is not a feasible approach for reforming Boko Haram fighters.”
James therefore said a mixture of ideological, religious re-education, and vocational
training was necessary to de-radicalize former fighters. He further explained that . . .
“former fighters who have gone through the de-radicalization program usual ended up
being harassed by the Police and the CJTF.”
Winning the hearts and minds of citizens in Northeast Nigeria. Boko Haram’s
elusive nature of blending quickly with the rest of the population after carrying out
terrorist attacks means the military has to work closely with members of the public to
enable them defeat the group decisively. In this regard, Salifu said, “The military in
recent times has embarked on measures aimed at improving community relations with
members of the public.” This endeavor by the military is laudable and must be
commended. Sandow expressed concern that:
There is a feeling of betrayal amongst individual informants within the
community who have acted on their own volition to provide actionable
intelligence on Boko Haram to the security forces. Government has not done
enough for them, considering the hardship members of the community have been
going through over the years.
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Based on this position, Muhammed said, “This does not negate the fact that the ongoing
community engagement strategy by government to win the hearts and minds of the locals
and counter the ideological propaganda Boko Haram is not making any impact.”
A multifaceted peace-building effort that targets communities in the Northeast of
Nigeria is also a necessity for winning the hearts and minds of community members who
are exposed to Boko Haram activities. Abdulai stated that “Several community members
within Boko Haram territories are bombarded by the group’s charismatic preachers with a
violent form of Islam.” Unfortunately, because those community members lack the
ability to reason logically, they simply accept that version to be the absolute truth. In the
opinion of Abdul, “it is only when the Nigerian Security Forces improve the way they
interact with the communities that they can win their allegiance and subsequently defeat
the resilience of Boko Haram.”
Some Nigerian Muslims endorse the implementation of the Sharia law in the
Northern part of Nigeria. However, many Muslims in Nigeria do not support the ideology
of Boko Haram which promotes the abduction and rape of women and girls, and also
misuse the doctrine of takfir to target moderate Muslims. Aliu said, “The extreme
ideology and brutality of the BHT group has alienated most civilians from the group.”
Kabiru also insisted that “The BHT group has no mechanism for sustaining the support of
ordinary people by winning their hearts and minds voluntarily.” Boko Haram has
alienated civilian populations in areas they control because many of their actions are
considered atrocious, brutal, and unIslamic.
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Dramani stated that, “to win the hearts and minds of the local population,
policymakers have to formalize and improve the authority of local institutions by making
decisions at the local level more inclusive.” This will enable communities who are even
in remote areas to offer counter-narrative responses to facilitate the defeat of the BHT
group. Sani was of the view that “addressing any lingering grievances of community
members could be a powerful tool for winning the hearts and minds of the local
population to facilitate the defeat of the ideology of Boko Haram.”
However, the security crackdown unleashed on ordinary civilians by the Nigerian
military, all in the name of countering Boko Haram was negating the effort of winning
the hearts and minds of the people. Ali stated that “The Nigerian Security Forces cannot
win the battle for the hearts and minds of the local population if they consistently violate
the human rights of the citizen and subject them to inhumane treatment.”
Negotiating with Boko Haram fighters. The debate over the best strategies to
defeat Boko Haram is a controversial issue in communities that have experienced
devastating atrocities from the group. However, majority of participants were skeptical
about the prospects of engaging Boko Haram in any meaningful dialogue or negotiations.
Charles stated that:
The problem is that over the years of the Boko Haram crisis, government had
often appointed and tasked various Committees to engage key members of the
group. However, when the Committee presents its report, the recommendations
are not implemented by the government.
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David was of the opinion that “any attempt to engage Boko Haram in any dialogue will
be useless given the background of many failed and subverted attempts due to the
existing mistrust between both parties.”
Rather, David called for collaborative efforts that will involve the local
community and civil society in tandem with security operations. Sani, Ali and Ogbey
agreed that, prominent Nigerians and civil societies have tried previously to establish
negotiations channel between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram. In all these
instances, the initiatives broke down and did not yield any positive results because Boko
Haram showed no real commitment towards abandoning its terrorist campaign against the
Federal Government of Nigeria. James and Johnson doubted whether the armed
campaign by Boko Haram could be brought to a negotiable and peaceful end.
Despite the previous failures in negotiations with Boko Haram, there are still calls
for government to continue to engage the group. Mustapha stated that “The persistence of
these calls stems partly from the acceptance of the fact that military operations alone
cannot defeat the resilience of the group.” Participants who favored dialogue with Boko
Haram stressed that negotiating with Boko Haram and releasing some of its members
from the prisons could facilitate the process of reconciliation. Seidu stated that “as a way
of building confidence between parties, negotiations on issues such as prisoner release
could also help that process.”
Even those confronted with the daily threat of Boko Haram terrorism expressed
the opinion that engaging Boko Haram in negotiations should be part of a holistic
approach to resolving the conflict. Hassan said:
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Realistically, the Nigerian Security Forces have done everything possible to
defeat Boko Haram militarily, but to no avail. The only way to end this conflict
once and for all is for the government to engage the remnants of Boko Haram in
negotiations.
Nonetheless, traditional Northern leaders who in the past served as intermediaries in the
attempt to negotiate peaceful settlement of the conflict between the government and Boko
Haram are now reluctant to do so. Bello said, “Northern traditional leaders do not want to
expose themselves and be further accused of being associated with religious fanaticism
because they engaged with the group in previous negotiations.”
Theme 3: Impact of Boko Haram Activities on the Socioeconomic Status of Nigeria
This theme was aimed at understanding participants experience regarding the
socioeconomic implications of Boko Haram’s atrocities in Northeast of Nigeria where the
group is active. Most participants noted that the activities of Boko Haram constituted a
serious threat to the socioeconomic development of Nigeria which has affected
commercial activities in the Northeast of Nigeria in particular. As a result of this
situation, Sandow said, “There is food scarcity in Nigeria because traders from Northern
Nigeria are unable to transport their foodstuffs to other parts of the country.” Sandow
explained that farmers out of fear for losing their lives have now abandoned their farming
activities and livelihoods. He said: “This has significantly reduced food production and
worsened the problems of household income generation, as well as, food supply to the
major cities.”
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The activities of Boko Haram are also geared towards dehumanizing women and
children. The increasing cases of rape of women and the abduction of children especially
girls, attest to this security threat. As a result, Abdulai said:
Professionals in Northeastern Nigeria were migrating and abandoning their
professions and occupations on account of the insecurity in the area. Most of these
migrants from the North of Nigeria are in their productive ages and are engaged in
farming and trading.
The unfavorable business environment created by the terrorist activities of Boko Haram
has also become a disincentive for local and foreign investors.
Foreign investors provide livelihood opportunities to community members
through the job opportunities that are created. James mentioned that the current situation
has destroyed the socioeconomic image of Nigeria and further added that: “the vicious
onslaughts on foreign investors who provide large scale services in the host communities
in Northeast of Nigeria are inimical to the socioeconomic prosperity of individuals.”
Charles stated that because of the growing insecurity in the North of Nigeria, the socioeconomic conditions in the area have been impacted negatively. He added that: “Many
people including businessmen are fleeing the North to a more peaceful environment in
the southern parts of the country.
Mustapha further disclosed that “The precarious security situation in the
Northeast of Nigeria has created many school dropouts, increased unemployment, and
thuggery amongst the young people.” In David’s view, the overall effects of Boko
Haram’s activities are fast affecting Nigeria’s socio-economic development and its
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overall economy potentials. He said, “Despite the enormous resources at the disposal of
the country, Nigeria has been compelled to focus its priorities on security to the detriment
of viable human capital development and investments in other productive sectors.”
Prior to the emergence of Boko Haram, tourism was a viable sector in Nigeria
with abundant economic and socio-cultural benefits in the Northern part of the country.
Salifu stated that “Due to the current security threats posed by the sporadic bombing by
Boko Haram, the industry has virtually collapsed.” In Ali’s view, for Nigeria to achieve
a favorable environment for socio-economic development to thrive, there should be an
inter-religious dialogue. . . “where Boko Haram would be engaged actively in a
collaborative manner to foster peace in the Northern parts of the Nigeria.”
Loss of livelihoods of people living in Northeast Nigeria. Johnson and
Mustapha intimated that Boko Haram was responsible for the deeply entrenched social
and economic marginalization and the loss of the livelihood of a large section of people
in the northeast region of Nigeria. The loss of peoples’ livelihoods according to
Muhammed has been occasioned by . . . “the bombing of churches, mosques, police
stations, schools, including Universities and other government infrastructures.” Aliu said
. . . “the extremist activities of Boko Haram in the northeast have generally brought
almost all the socio-economic activities to a standstill thereby affecting the livelihoods of
majority of community members in the region”
The social problems in Nigeria have a direct impact on the political environment,
security, and the economic situation in the country. Seidu was of the opinion that any
turbulence in any of these sectors usually has a direct impact on the others. He said: For
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instance, political instability usually leads to economic problems, which then triggers
social and security concerns.” In his view, the remedies for the prevailing socioeconomic problems due to the activities of the BHT group can be found in the political,
economic, and socio-cultural space in Nigeria.
The loss of the livelihoods of the people in Northeast Nigeria can be attributed to
the activities of Boko Haram. This situation is present in a mixture of volatile, ambiguous
and complex security issues that have rendered many people unable to attain their full
economic potentials. Sani identified the socio-economic issues in the Northeast of
Nigeria to include the “lack of education, loss of livelihood, cultural and religious
discrimination, overpopulation, unemployment, and poverty.” Abdul stated that the
socio-economic consequence of the atrocities of Boko Haram was “the loss of livelihood
and the associated poverty which has become common in the region.
Ogbey pointed out that “these factors which are prevalent in Northeast of Nigeria
have had negative influence on the economic activities of individuals and their
livelihoods.” Other participants agreed that the current insecurity in Northern Nigeria
was due to the high level of poverty in that part of the country as a result of loss of
livelihoods of the people. Bello concluded that “the situation was making communities
that have lost their livelihoods to be vulnerable to the nefarious recruitment schemes of
Boko Haram.”
The socioeconomic disparities Between the North and South of Nigeria. A
sharp socio- economic disparity exists between the Northern and Southern parts of
Nigeria. Though the Northern part of the country is highly populated, their level of
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education for instance in comparison to people in the South was below expectation. There
was broad consensus amongst participants that young Nigerians in the Northern region
are confronted with abject poverty and socio-economic dislocation. Kabiru observed that:
“The socio-economic disparity has been exacerbated further by the oppressive
counterinsurgency campaign being waged by the Security forces which tend to make the
youth support the BHT group.”
David blamed colonialism for the socio-economic disparities between the people
in the North compared to those in the South of Nigeria. He stated that “What the colonial
masters did was to create an elite economic class in the Southern part of the country to
administer the Northern part of Nigeria.” Overtime, Hassan said, “This fault line has been
further exploited to the extent that the level of mass poverty in the North has become
endemic compared to the South.” Bello and Dramani disclosed that the socio- economic
disparities in the North of Nigeria has made the region a safe haven for mobilizing and
recruiting new members. Richard noted that the BHT group has been able to successfully
frame these longstanding socio-economic grievances to their advantage. In his view . . .
“the combination of these socio-economic grievances has been exploited by the group to
gain legitimacy in it terrorist attacks.”
Theme 4: Boko Haram use of Social Media to Garner Support
The threats posed to the Nigeria state by Boko Haram’s online propaganda are
enormous. This theme therefore provided some clarity over the intentions of the group in
the social media domain. James stated that:
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The proficiency of terrorist organizations in the use of social media to
communicate and propagandize their members is on the rise. The efficacy of
Boko Haram’s operations is based on their reliance on easy-to-use social media
platforms as broadcast channels.
Sandow said, “Boko Haram is skillful in the use of various social media platforms. No
one should therefore dismiss the importance the group places on the use of android
phones.” Aliu confirmed the fact that: “Boko Haram fighters use complex
communication technologies that depend on social media platforms to communicate both
publicly and secretly to their members.”
Social movements are often driven by grievances such as the deterioration of
political, social, and the economic situations of the people. Such grievances which are
common in the Northeast of Nigeria where Boko Haram operates can be exploited by the
group through the use of social media platforms. Sani said: “Boko Haram members rely
on the print and online social media to blame the government for these grievances and
seeking public sympathy for their cause.” Kabiru stated that Boko Haram has mastered
the use of social media tools such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and email to facilitate
their social interactions with the population. Richard pointed out that the dissemination of
instant messages from Boko Haram members to its sympathizers during its social
mobilization was not limited to only social media. He said: “They also use traditional
media platforms such as print media, radio and television which offer rapid and wider
coverage.” On his part, Ogbey said:

84
The urgency for Boko Haram to disseminate information to its followers and the
process of sharing intelligence obtain from social media platforms amongst
security agencies has become a contest amongst the security agencies, thus,
becoming more of a dilemma in the quest to defeat Boko Haram.
Seidu was of the opinion that Boko Haram has become very conscious of the usefulness
of social media in propagating its messages. He said: “The group is therefore taking
advantage of the accessibility to mass audience to incorporate the use of social media
platforms in their indoctrination and radicalization agenda.”
Through social media, Bello said Boko Haram is able to directly connect with a
vast majority of its audience. Sani also intimated that: “On a daily basis, Boko Haram
sends several messages on various social media platforms to its followers, enemies and
would-be recruits.” This regular broadcast and exchanges on social media has helped the
group to establish good comradeship with their sympathizers. Johnson stated that by
using Facebook, Boko Haram had moved away from their dependency on mainstream
media. “Boko Haram’s shift to the use of Facebook has helped them in bringing the
group’s messages closer to its target audience,” he said. Charles recalled that from 2013,
the use of social media had increasingly played significant roles in Boko Haram’s
messaging. He said, “Boko Haram frequently used Facebook to post its communications
because of the platform’s wide coverage among the population in Northern Nigeria.”
Social media messages from Boko Haram often centered on the legitimacy of
Islam and the use of passages from the Quran to extol the religion. They also preach
messages against democracy and the so-called Western form of education. Muhammed
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said the use of various social media platforms by Boko Haram to communicate the
routine in member’s daily life was a way to attract more individuals to join them. Boko
Haram’s strategic use of social media also demonstrates the resourcefulness of the group
in mobilizing sympathizers from other countries within the sub region. Abdulai stated
that “The increasing access of Boko Haram to social media platforms have made it
possible for a pool of potential supporters to be recruited into the group.”
The good thing in the battle on social media platforms against Boko Haram is that
the security agencies can also use same social media for networking amongst themselves
in the fight against the group. Salifu explained that, security agencies in other geopolitical
zones in Nigeria could communicate with other security agents in the Northern
geopolitical zone through the social media platforms.
Government use of social media to counter Boko Haram ideology. The use of
social media by government and the security forces in Nigeria to combat Boko Haram
terrorism and other forms of crimes has evolved over the years. Given that BHT group
now propagate its ideology via the use of social media, the same social media can be used
by the government to enhance the level of interaction amongst security agencies as they
endeavor to counter Boko Haram’s ideology. Mustapha observed that the recent use of
social media to counter the ideology of Boko Haram has contributed significantly in
improving support from some community members in the Northeastern part of Nigeria.
Because the government has been slow in espousing a superior counter-ideology
in combating Boko Haram, this has led to delay in defeating the Boko Haram ideology.
Hassan said the inability to use social media to re-orientate and enlighten community

86
members about the dangers posed by Boko Haram activities may run the risk of
damaging the security forces’ relationships with community members in the northeastern
part of Nigeria. He said that:
The essence of espousing superior ideology using social media platforms is to
build trust with communities members through consultation as a way of
enhancing the legitimacy of on-going counterterrorism efforts against Boko
Haram. The security forces therefore need to augment the fire for fire approach by
increasing community engagement using various social media platforms.
Dramani was of the view that the effective use of social media to combat
terrorism depends on the support and cooperation from the general public. The use of
social media to engage community members in the Northeastern part of Nigeria could . . .
“lead to an improved community engagement that can facilitate the passing of terror
related actionable intelligence to the security agencies for them to take swift action.”
Bello advocated for the aggressive use of social media by government to sensitize
community members about the dangers of Boko Haram activities and the need for them
to actively support the security agencies to defeat the group. He stated that “Community
members can serve as informants via social media by helping to prevent possible Boko
Haram threats.”
Engaging the community using social media for counter-ideology. After
several years of delays, the Nigerian government’s counter terrorism strategy has now
acknowledged the importance of using social media interventions to counter the ideology
of Boko Haram. Even at that, Richard stated that:
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The approach has so far been confrontational and seemingly contradictory in
terms of its rhetoric and practice. This has led to the strategy being criticized by
community members in the Northeast of Nigeria. The use of social media for
counter-ideology against Boko Haram has also been less concerned with counterradicalization given that Boko Haram members employ Islam to justify their
violent actions.
In this regard, Sani and Dramani both agreed that a more realistic approach for
using social media in any counter-radicalization effort to oppose Boko Haram’s
ideological messages was for government to partner community groups, nongovernmental organizations, and the Muslim clerics to develop counter-narratives.
Hassan stated that “Social media can play a vital role in promoting a counter-narrative to
facilitate counter radicalization and de-radicalization to reform Boko Haram
sympathizers.” Abdul was of the opinion that a comprehensive counter-narrative should
include “the political, historical, socio-psychological, theological, and instrumental
dimensions of the violent extremist ontology in question.”
Any social media strategy for countering the Boko Haram ideology should be
based on three steps. First, the message should be attractive and tailored to different
audiences, especially to the youth. It is therefore important in the first step to admit the
validity of the youth’s grievances by offering alternative strategies for addressing those
grievances. The second step is to be particular with the background and credibility of the
messengers because the identity of the bearers of the message matters in the area of
ideological de-radicalization. As Mustapha put it:
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The message to be conveyed should be transmitted by credible messengers such
as Muslim clerics or Sheikhs. Hearing the theological counter narrative directly
from credible and respected Sheikhs will resonate well with Boko Haram fighters
and they are likely to imbibe the message because they know them.
Finally, the third step is the use of social media to promote and propagate the counter
narrative messages.
Summary
This chapter presented the findings after analyzing responses from 20 participants
in the study. I used the NVivo software in the data analysis and applied a thematic
analysis framework to interpret the data collected. This enabled me to find the central
ideas embedded in the data and further identify common phrases and themes.
Participants observed that the willingness of the local populace to provide safe
sanctuaries for Boko Haram members was as a result of the ongoing counterproductive
military operations which have alienated the locals. The further said, regardless of the
immediate benefits of the military campaign, it was not effective in defeating the
ideology of Boko Haram. The participants also indicated the need for a more
comprehensive de-radicalization program to defeat the group’s resilience. Others
advocated for Muslim clerics to lead the counter-ideology strategies aspect in the deradicalization effort by engaging the former fighters in religious re-education.
Participants were of the opinion that a critical part of any counter-ideology
strategy required for defeating the resilience of Boko Haram is for the Nigerian Security
Forces to improve their interaction with the communities to win their allegiance. Some
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participants were of the view that Boko Haram has become conscious of the usefulness of
social media in their indoctrination and radicalization agenda. However, social media
platforms could also be harnessed by security agencies to develop a counter-ideology
strategy to defeat against Boko Haram’s ideology. In Chapter 5, I provided a summary of
the study after which my interpretations and findings were shared. Finally, I concluded
followed by my recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to provide a counter-ideology strategy to
defeat the BHT group, which has not been done by the Nigerian Armed Forces. This
study was focused on how Boko Haram’s ideology motivates the resilience of its
members. Any attempt to eliminate this ideology and defeat the group requires a
multifaceted approach with emphasis on counter-ideology. Although it has been
acknowledged that counter-ideology responses to terrorist propaganda is an important
part of every counterterrorism strategy, up until now, the Nigerian authorities have no
clear counter-ideological framework against Boko Haram. Additionally, there were
limited empirical data on counter-ideological work against the BHT group, which
justified the importance of researching on this topic. To bridge this gap in literature, I
interviewed 20 participants made up of Muslim clerics, community leaders, and military
personnel. This study thus provided the framework from which counter-ideological work
could facilitate the eventual defeat of the resilience of the BHT group. The outcome of
the study provided insights into the extent to which counter-ideology strategies can be
instituted to defeat the BHT group along the following themes:
1.

Curtailing both the active and passive support for BHT group.

2.

Requirement for a broad approach for de-radicalization of BHT group.

3.

Impact of Boko Haram activities on the socioeconomic status of Nigeria.

4.

The use of the print and electronic media to garner support.
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Interpretation of the Findings
Support for Members of Boko Haram Terrorist Group
Theme 1 revealed that the resilience of Boko Haram was grounded on the Salafist
ideology. The group was also found to enjoy limited local sympathy and support from the
ranks of educated, uneducated, and impoverished youth across Northern Nigeria.
Participants explained that these supporters were unwilling to betray Boko Haram
members—an act that also contributed to the resilience of the group against the
government’s counterterrorism efforts.
However, researchers have indicated a limited appeal among Nigerians to Boko
Haram’s ideology. For example, Onuoh (2014) and Weeraratne (2017) suggested that
because of Boko Haram’s strict adherence to the Quran to the exclusion of the Hadith and
other generally accepted secondary sources of Islamic law, the group does not enjoy
popular support among mainstream Nigerian Muslims. Despite the limited appeal among
Nigerians for Boko Haram, there is a lack of support for government’s response to the
group. This was found to be due to the indiscriminate military strikes against the group,
which have been regarded as counterproductive. Participants further explained that
because the military operations often killed innocent local civilians, the security forces
have alienated members of the affected communities. Onuoha (2014) and Human Rights
Watch (2015) both stated that the local population, local opinion leaders, civil society
organizations, and the media have all criticized the military for their indiscriminate
killings of civilians. Research has also confirmed that the military response by the
government of Nigeria to defeat the ideological orientation of Boko Haram has been
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largely unsuccessful (Abiodun & Abila, 2018; Allen, 2017; Botha & Abdile, 2019; Hentz
& Solomon, 2017). Further, the predominantly military approach to counteracting Boko
Haram will continue to generate tensions between the government and the local people
unless a broader counterterrorism approach is adopted to identify the source of the
group’s resilience and target it (de Montclos, 2014; Sampson, 2016; Serrano & Pieri,
2014).
Some of the participants also explained that the reason for the resilience of Boko
Haram was because of the role the group’s ideology plays in winning sympathy from
Muslims. These Boko Haram sympathizers believe that the group is fighting for the
aggrieved Muslim constituency in Nigeria. For example, Kassim (2015) indicated that
Boko Haram indoctrinates its followers to believe that the group is defending the tenets
of Islam, their struggle is for Islam, and that their philosophies represent the true Islam.
To further accentuate the impression that its ideology is founded on Islam, they quote
portions of the Quran, the Hadits, and opinions of classical Muslim scholars, to justify
their terrorist acts against their perceived enemies (Boutz, Benninger, & Lancaster, 2018;
Tibi, 2017). Additionally, Boko Haram leaders elicit support from individuals by
consistently using religious rhetoric to justify the group’s campaign of violence against
the Nigerian State (Brigaglia, 2015). Such rhetoric has been designed to appeal to
Muslims support and provide a narrative that generates fears amongst pious Muslims of
the looming threat of Islam losing grounds to the forces of immorality (Pieri & Zenn,
2016).
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Participants confirmed that the BHT group expected Muslims to be in constant
war against non-Muslims because in their mind, the state was collaborating with
Christians to target Nigerian Muslims. Armed jihad was therefore the only means to
change the current fate of the Muslims in their quest to establish the Caliphate. This
conclusion is supported by literature that confirms the fact that because Boko Haram’s
ideology was based on the submission and allegiance to Allah alone, members considered
killing themselves as an act of martyrdom and the way to sacriﬁce for Islam (Hove &
Chenzi, 2017; Juergensmeyer, 2017; Nilsson, 2017).
Requirement for a Broad Approach for De-radicalization of the Boko Haram
Terrorist Group
The findings from Theme 2 indicated that the de-radicalization program as
expressed in the 2014 National Security Strategy was an option to augment the ongoing
military approach. However, most of the participants said that the strategy has failed to
defeat the resilience of the BHT group due to many problems. The challenges confronting
the Nigerian government’s de-radicalization program explain why it has not made any
significant impact in defeating Boko Haram’s ideology, which underlies the group’s
resilience (David, Asuelime, & Onapajo, 2015; Tella, 2018).
One of the problems with the de-radicalization program included setting it up in
the Nigerian Prisons Service (Barkindo, 2016). There was a lack of awareness on how
former Boko Haram fighters should be managed among prison staff at all levels of the
de-radicalization program (Barkindo, 2016). Moreover, risk assessment on the deradicalization process was only focused on the risk of former Boko Haram fighters
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escaping. Furthermore, there was short supply of credible speakers who could relate to
the personal and psychological needs of former Boko Haram fighters in the prisons.
Participants also accused some members of the CJTF of affecting the efforts of
the de-radicalization process during their counterinsurgent vigilante work by harassing
former Boko Haram fighters who have been successfully de-radicalized. This opinion is
confirmed by a footage showing members of the CJTF involved in slitting of the throats
of Boko Haram suspects and then pushing them into open mass graves (Allen, 2017;
Amnesty International, 2014). Despite these challenges, the Nigerian government has
made some positive strides in de-radicalizing former members of Boko Haram in various
prisons.
It was also observed by participants that the Nigerian government has conceded
the need to fight Boko Haram by engaging them in a war of ideas rather than a military
fire power approach. Accordingly, some Islamic clerics have been engaged by
government to preach on radio and television as a way of preventing radicalization and
averting the luring of individuals into terrorism. Government has permitted Islamic
clerics to engage with Boko Haram fighters to challenge their interpretation of the Quran
and their belief system with the hope that they can be reformed and reintegrated into
society (Sampson, 2016). The use of Islamic clerics in forestalling extremism has been
effective in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore (Aljunied, 2012). Similarly, Islamic
clerics in Nigeria can also collaborate with community leaders, traditional, and religious
leaders as well as nongovernmental organizations to play meaningful roles in the deradicalization process by facilitating dialogue and reconciliation (Aljunied, 2012).
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Participants also suggested that the ongoing community engagement strategy by
the government to counter the ideological propaganda of Boko Haram was not making
the expected impact. They attributed this to the government not addressing the grievances
of community members. Consequently, the government and the security forces will have
difficulty appealing to the local population to facilitate the defeat of the ideology of Boko
Haram (Eji, 2016; Falode, 2016; Sergie & Johnson, 2015). Thus, an effective tool for
appealing the local population is for the government to formalize and improve the
authority of local institutions by making local decision making more inclusive. This
could be achieved through the active participation of those who will be affected by the
outcome of such decisions.
There was no consensus in the opinions of participants about the prospects of
engaging Boko Haram in any meaningful dialogue or negotiations. The literature has
supported this lack of consensus. Some scholars support the “no negotiation” stance,
whereas others support meaningful dialogue with terrorist groups (Atkinson, Sandler, &
Tschirhart, 1987; Hoffman, 2004; Lake, 2002; Neumann, 2007; Speckhard &
Akhmedova, 2005). The pro-negotiation scholars maintain that the government
unconsciously dialogues with terrorists, whether it recognizes this or not. For this reason,
many Boko Haram scholars support the prospect of dialogue and negotiations with Boko
Haram (Nwankpa, 2017). However, Uchehara (2014) and Agbiboa (2014) argued that
efforts by government to dialogue with Boko Haram, including the recent amnesty offer
extended to its members, have failed due to distrust on both sides and the breakup of the
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group into different factions. But some scholars argue that maintaining the notion of no
negotiation with BHT group was not less damaging than negotiating.
Impact of Boko Haram Activities on the Socioeconomic Status of Nigeria
Participants were unanimous in their views concerning the negative
socioeconomic impact of Boko Haram activities on Nigerians. The loss of the livelihoods
of individuals, increasing amount of unemployed youths, and poverty in Northern Nigeria
were the main concerns. This finding is supported by various scholars whose works have
shown that the emergence and growth of Boko Haram was closely associated with the
high levels of poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment in Northeast Nigeria (Kolade, 2018;
Rogers, 2012; Salaam, 2012). According to official statistics, the most significant risk
factor responsible for the spread of poverty and unemployment among the youth in the
northeast region of Nigeria was the Boko Haram insurgency (National Bureau of
Statistics, 2012; World Bank, 2013).
The social problems in Nigeria caused by the activities of the BHT group were
also observed to have had a direct impact on the political environment, security, and the
economic situation in the country. The unemployment situation in Northeast Nigeria was
not only a problem to individuals but also creates economical and psychologically
challenges to Nigerian society (Ajufo, 2013; Ayegba, 2015). Due to the unemployment,
there has been an increased dependence on family, which has been correlated with the
high rate of poverty prevailing in the country. The unemployment among the younger
population had also been the cause of the increase in various crimes such as kidnapping,
armed robbery, and other deviant behaviors such as terrorism in Nigeria.

97
There is a link between the socioeconomic dislocations in Northern Nigeria and
the viability of recruiting new Boko Haram members. This link is consistent with
research indicating the ability of some influential people and actors in Northeast Nigeria
to manipulate and influence some poor and discontent individuals to engage in terrorist
acts (Adelaja, Labo & Penar, 2018; Akubor, 2016; Dauda, 2017). Similarly, Umar (2013)
believe that poverty and the continuing economic disparities in the northeastern part of
Nigeria were responsible for the terrorism in that region. He further stated that a country
like Nigeria which is facing economic stagnation, higher level of unemployment, and
disparities in economic development was a fertile ground for terrorism to flourish.
Moreover, participants expressed their concerns on how the existing poverty,
unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalization in Northern
Nigeria have been used by Boko Haram to recruit its members. This resonates with the
assertion that economically deprived youth in Northern Nigeria can be easily recruited by
the extremist group, due to the economic hardship in that region (Umar, 2013; Olojo,
2013). The huge number of unemployed young people living on the margins in Northern
Nigeria further complicates the situation.
Boko Haram use of Social Media to Garner Support
It was apparent in the findings of this study that Boko Haram has mastered the use
of social media tools to facilitate their social interactions with their members and the
larger Nigerian population. This finding resonated with the view of U Eyo & Collins
(2018) that presently, about 90 percent of terrorist groups’ such as Boko Haram
communicate over the Internet through the use of social media. The reason is because the
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youth favor social media interactions which enable them to freely share messages and
even contribute to discussions regarding the activities of BHT group.
Ogunlana (2019) further illustrated the fact that Boko Haram has embraced
innovative social media technologies for spreading its religious ideology, raising money,
conspiring, planning, and executing their attacks. Similarly, Hakeem (2017) confirmed
that as a consequence of the massive military crackdown on Boko Haram, the group has
resorted to the use of social media such as video releases, obviously to sustain its
resilience.
The present danger according to majority of participants is that Boko Haram has
succeeded in transforming social media into tools of propaganda. Such publicity through
the use of social media has also been weaponized to coordinate attacks, communicate,
and spread messages of hate and their violent ideology. The ideologies of Boko Haram
which is found to be consistent with the literature reviewed are against democracy and
the so-called Western form of education. They also extol the activities of the group by
wrongly using passages from the Quran. Furthermore, Agbiboa & Maiangwa (2014);
Omoera & Ryanga (2017), confirmed that Boko Haram websites serve as a virtual
training grounds that post messages in the form of propaganda videos to boost the morale
of members.
The study findings also provided insight into the Nigerian government’s
acknowledgement of the importance of using social media interventions to counter the
ideology of Boko Haram. Participants were optimistic that, as part of the counter
terrorism strategy against Boko Haram, the security agencies can also use social media
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for networking amongst themselves in their operations. Jibril, Mohammed & Yakubu
(2017) confirmed this finding from their research which concluded that law enforcement
and intelligence agencies now employ social media analytics to improve situational
awareness by identifying terrorist locations and generating early warnings on the
activities of Boko Haram operatives as a means of obtaining real-time alerts.
The study findings are also consistent with participant’s observation of
government’s slow pace in the use of social media platforms for gathering information
and surveillance to combat Boko Haram. The weaknesses in information gathering and
surveillance by the security operatives and their inability to check the inﬂux of illegal
aliens at the nation’s porous borders was cited as an example some of the inadequacies
facing the security agencies (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012).
Some participants were also of the conviction that government’s response in
countering the ideology of Boko Haram’s was not enduring. Olojo (2017) for instance
explained the influential role Muslim clerics could play in the broader struggle against
Boko Haram. They further observed that Islamic clerics could play important roles to
counteract Boko Haram by using social media to promote and propagate counternarrative messages against the group. Another observation that resonated with these
findings was for government to partner with community groups, non-governmental
organizations, and the Muslim clerics to develop counter-narratives against the BHT
group (Agbiboa, 2014).
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Limitation of the Study
There are some limitations to this study. Firstly, there is dearth of archival
documents on counter-ideology as a strategy for counteracting the BHT group. This
compelled me to develop a research typology that relied on secondary data sources such
as academic articles and books, many of which contained elements of propaganda
specifically designed to encourage researchers to imbibe a parochial perspective. This
limitation emanating from the lack of prior studies and poor literature support could have
had an impact on the theoretical foundations for the research question that was
investigated and potentially affect the reliability of the findings concerning the usefulness
of defeating the ideology of the BHT group.
Secondly, the sampling errors associated with the snowballing method of
obtaining the data is a limitation concern. I had no control over the sampling method used
in the referral process which could have had some elements of a bias resulting from, the
tendency of initial participants to nominate people that they knew well. Because of this, it
is highly possible that the subjects share the same traits and characteristics. This
limitation was however overcome by collecting a sizeable number of referrals from
which I randomly selected the participants.
Recommendations
The recommendations for this study are presented in two parts. The first part
focuses on recommendations to the government of Nigeria as related to the findings and
the second segment focuses on areas for future research. The following recommendations
could help Nigeria to effectively respond to the BHT group:
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 The Nigerian government should work toward winning the hearts and minds
of the population in Northeast of Nigeria by addressing the longstanding
socio-economic inequalities and the human security issues in the region.
 The Nigerian government must develop an effective reconciliatory national
security Strategy based on a Religious Rehabilitation Group similar to the
Singaporean experience that will focus on formulating counter ideological
policies. Such a strategy will curtail the recurrence of extremism and also
mitigate the effects the government’s coercive approach.
 Though the CJTF has recorded successes in containing Boko Haram, the
Nigerian Government needs to be carefully. The Nigerian government should
start a process to monitor, incorporate or employ the youth from such militias
once the conflict comes to an end to avert those militias themselves becoming
a threat to the state in future.
 The social media landscape must continuously be monitored through an
effective Counter-ideological Communications strategy. This should be done
by using multiple mediums of communications to develop a communication
campaign to counter the ideational packages that the BHT group espouses to
persuade individuals and elicit support from its followers. Such a strategy
should be based on three steps. First, the message should be attractive and
tailored to the youth. The second step should take into account the background
and credibility of the messengers because the identity of the bearers of the
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message matters in ideological de-radicalization. The last step should engage
the use of social media to promote and propagate the counter narratives.
 The Nigerian military should be employed more in a non-combatant role to
facilitate political dialogue to win the trust of Boko Haram members and
attract their leaders to a negotiated solution
Further research on the efficacy of counter-ideological programs should explore
the role of cultural and tribal affiliation in developing counter-ideology strategies.
Another area that deserves further research is how to evaluate the effectiveness of a
counter-ideology policy in defeating Boko Haram. Unless there is a proper framework to
evaluate the counter-ideology policies, their effectiveness in defeating Boko Haram’s
resilience may not be established and no lessons would be learned.
Implications
The state of insecurity in Nigeria as a result of the activities of the BHT group
continues to impact negatively on individuals, families, organizations, as well as, the
larger society. Despite the abundance of human and natural resources available in the
country, chronic youths’ unemployment is evident in Nigeria. Such a phenomenon
amongst the unemployed youth erodes their confidence for a brighter future and creates a
vicious cycle of poverty that serves as a fertile ground for radicalization and recruitment.
The potential impact of this qualitative study for social change is that counter-ideology
offers a non-military counterterrorism approach for defeating the resilience of Boko
Haram. Defeating Boko Haram will eventually improve the security situation in Nigeria
and help the youth to achieve their full potentials.

103
The study also presents empirical rationalization to the debate to shift focus away
from the current military-centric counterterrorism approach to a more appropriate
counter-ideology response as a means to defeat Boko Haram. As already alluded to, the
human rights abuses perpetrated by the military has greatly contributed to the current
hostile relationship existing between the military and the civilian population in Northeast
of Nigeria. This study could also serve as a non-military counterterrorism policy process
based on counter-ideology. Furthermore, it will facilitate greater communication,
coordination, and collaboration amongst the security agencies and help eliminate the
acrimony between the civilian population and other relevant stakeholders in dealing with
the threat of terrorist ideologies.
Conclusion
There have been various efforts by the government of Nigeria for nearly two
decades to control the terrorist activities of the BHT group. The group, however, have
proved resilient as they continue to carry out attacks within Nigeria and even beyond.
This study therefore examined Boko Haram’s ideology and its territorial ambitions as a
basis for developing counter-ideology strategies to defeat the group. The findings from
this study were drawn from interviews conducted within the field and secondary archival
sources.
Twenty participants volunteered and took part in the semi-structured interviews to
reach saturation. The dataset was consequently analyzed using NVivo software after
which a thematic analysis framework was applied in interpreting the data collected. This
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enabled me to find the central ideas embedded in the data and further identify common
phrases and themes.
This study was anchored on the relational/vengeance and relative deprivation
theories. A major conclusion from the research was that the resilience of Boko Haram
and its capacity to survive for a longer time was premised upon the group’s ability to
maintain an ideological consistency with global jihadī-Salaﬁsm. The antecedent of such
ideology is drawn from the historical jihadist tradition of Don Fodio in Northern Nigeria.
Though Nigerian government has an upper hand against the BHT group, this advantage
can easily be lost if the government remains absorbed in the current exclusive military
and security approach.
Consequently, it is suggested that the end of Boko Haram terrorism will be
determined largely by the extent to which the Nigerian government is able to effectively
employ counter-ideology strategies in its counterterrorism campaign. While military
might is important to decimate Boko Haram, counter-ideology will be more decisive in
preventing the group from replenishing its membership through the means of new
recruitments.
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Appendix: Interview Protocol
Section A: Preambles
Topic: Counter-Ideology as a Wider Strategy for Defeating the Boko Haram Terrorist
Group

Research Question: To what extent can counter-ideology strategies be instituted to defeat
the BHT group?

Purpose: This interview protocol guides the researcher’s interview with Muslim clerics,
community leaders, and military personnel who have been engaged in combat operations
against the BHT group.

Date:
Time:
Name, Title and Unit of the Interviewee:
Interviewer:
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Section B: Socio- Demographic Characteristics of Respondent
1. Name of Camp-------------------------------------------------------------------------2. Age (years): (a) 20-29 [
60yrs [

] (b) 30-39 [

] (c) 40-49 [

] (d) 50-59 [ ] above

]

3. Religion: (a) Islam [
Others (specify) [
4. Marital status

] (b) Christianity [

] (c) Traditional Religion [

] (d)

]

(a) Single [

]

(b) Married [

] (c) Divorce/separated [ ] d)

Others
5. Level of Education: (a) Primary [
d) Degree/HND [

]

] (b) Secondary [

] (c) Diploma/NCE [

]

e) Other (please specify---------------

Section C: Questions to Participant
1. How has the oppressive counterinsurgency campaign by the Security forces’
against Boko Haram contributed in sustaining the group’s popular support?
2. What extent has the resilience of Boko Haram been impacted by ongoing counter
terrorism efforts by the Nigerian government?
3. What is the role of ideology in the terrorist behavior of members of the BHT
group?
4. How will a reorientation of the minds of Boko Haram supporters help in defeating
the group’s ideology?
5. To what extent would you say the ideology of the BHT group is responsible for
the resilience of the group?
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6. Since Boko Haram has survived numerous military operations, how can counter
ideology strategies effectively neutralize the group?
7. What role can the military play in targeting and defeating the ideology of Boko
Haram?
8. Why has the Nigerian Armed Forces De-radicalization Program remained
unsuccessful in the fight against the BHT group?
9.

How does the ideology of the BHT group attract the youth?

10. What are the vulnerabilities of the ideology of the BHT group?
Closing question: Can you recommend any other person(s) that in your view, can
provide further insights into the questions posed?

